Hi folks, Pranav here.
I suppose what I’m going to say next is the most clichéd, repeated statement of the past year, but the rules-based world trade order as we know it is fracturing. The US has weaponised tariffs, the WTO is effectively paralysed, and while globalisation still stands strong, its nature has changed, as every country is scrambling to secure its place in the new paradigm.
India is no exception to this. In response, we’re signing trade deals at an unusual pace, navigating a delicate negotiation with the US, and confronting a long-deferred but urgent question: can we finally build the manufacturing base our ambitions require? To make sense of it all, we spoke to Ajay Srivastava.
He’s the founder of the Global Trade Research Initiative, one of India’s sharpest independent voices on trade, whose work we’ve often referred to on The Daily Brief. His experience is informed by his decades of work in the Indian Trade Service, giving him hands-on experience in trade policy making and actual trade negotiations with other nations. Interestingly, he’s also the first-ever student to be admitted into the Indian School of Business.
We sat down with him for a long conversation that ran from the macro — what Trump’s tariffs have actually done to the world order — to the uncomfortably specific: why Bangladesh exports more than three times as much garment as India despite having a fraction of India’s resources, why India’s software giants have not made a serious bet on AI, and why the cotton-yarn-to-fabric value chain in India is, in his words, “almost broken at the scale level”.
Some of the things he said stuck with us. We’re sharing six of them here.
On countries surrendering to Trump
After April 2025, the question was whether Trump’s first tariff shock would shake loose something new — a Europe that pushed back, an Asia that organised around something other than access to the American market. It didn’t. Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the European Union — one after another, they came to terms. Srivastava’s reading of that queue is blunt:
“The last one year convinced me that America is the real, real superpower. Not in the positive sense I’m talking about. I thought countries had their own minds and they talked about whatever suited them. But the way things happened in the past year after Mr. Trump imposed tariffs, most of the big economies abjectly surrendered before Trump. Japan — such a big economy, such a competitive economy — they surrendered abjectly before Trump. South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, forget about small countries. Except for China, Russia, and a few more countries, nobody was willing to even talk as equals before Mr. Trump. Everybody surrendered and agreed to abject terms in trade deals with the US.”
On trade deals being peripheral
India has signed twenty FTAs in its history, ten of them in the past five years — covering the EU, the UAE, the UK, Switzerland, Norway, ASEAN, Japan, South Korea. Measured by volume and pace, it is one of the more impressive stretches of trade diplomacy by any large developing country. But Srivastava believes it is not enough:
“My take is this: trade agreements are just the periphery. If you have a good product, it will sell. China did not have a trade deal till 2000 with any major power, and they were already one of the largest exporters — maybe after Germany, I think they were the second-largest before joining the WTO — because of their product strength. They didn’t even have branded products then. They were just manufacturing products for European and American companies and selling. We don’t talk about these things. Our focus is mostly on trade deals.”
On India’s product stagnation after the ‘90s
India’s garment exports last year were around fifteen billion dollars. Bangladesh’s were over fifty billion. The gap is not explained by wages alone — Bangladesh’s cost advantage is real, but it is not three times Indian labour costs. The real explanation is product mix: seventy percent of global garment sales are now synthetic garments, sportswear, and winter wear, categories that emerged as dominant after 1990. India never seriously competed in them.
“We were very good until about twenty years back in labour-intensive goods. But now we are beaten in most labour-intensive goods by smaller countries. Our garment exports last year were about fifteen billion dollars worldwide. How much did Bangladesh export? More than fifty billion dollars. Look closely: seventy percent of world garment sales are synthetic garments, mixed garments, sportswear, and winter wear. Our share in that seventy percent is very low. That category developed after the 1990s, and whatever product expertise we developed till the ‘90s has not improved much since then. We were very happy that we were liberalising, opening to the world, generating new entrepreneurs — but we have not looked into product development.”
On what to do about it
Srivastava’s prescription has two parts. For the ninety percent of products where India has the underlying capability but has stopped trying, he wants reverse engineering at scale — mobilising engineering colleges to close the gap. For the ten percent where India genuinely lacks the technology, he wants anchor firms, the way Suzuki was invited in 1983.
“We have to do a reverse engineering exercise in a massive way across the nation. We have to tie up with the top five hundred engineering colleges, give them two or three products and say, ‘Reverse-engineer these.’ We can reverse-engineer pharma molecules and recreate the drug at one-twentieth or one-hundredth the price. For the ten percent where high technology is needed and we don’t have it, we need to follow the model like Suzuki. We invited Suzuki in 1983, and Maruti Suzuki was just a miracle. It enhanced the productivity of India’s entire auto sector by two hundred and fifty percent in the next fifteen years. Everybody got competitive pressure.”
On India’s real China problem
The India-China trade deficit — one hundred and ten billion dollars, with Indian exports below twenty billion — gets framed almost universally as an import problem. Srivastava argues the framing is misleading.
“While on the face of it the deficit looks bad, the goods we’re importing are absolutely needed in India. And except for a few chemicals, I don’t think they are being dumped — we import them because we need them. Imports are high, but China is the top import supplier to almost all major countries. India is not the only one. India’s problem is not high imports. India’s problem is low exports. Our exports are less than twenty billion dollars — where they were five or six years back, with no growth. So we have to focus on exports.”
On the WTO’s fracture
The WTO’s consensus rule was designed for a world where even powerful countries accepted some constraint on their unilateralism. That world is ending.
“The basic rule of the WTO is that it has one hundred and sixty-six members, and a rule can be set only when all one hundred and sixty-six members agree. America feels the consensus principle is hurting. They want to convert the WTO from a consensus-driven one entity to a coalition-driven organisation. Countries like India fear that if this happens, the issues of our choice — agriculture tariffs, agriculture subsidies, developmental concerns — developed countries will not be talking about those things. I think in the next two or three ministerials they are going to be successful, and the WTO may lose its identity unless something unforeseen happens.”
Listen to the full conversation on YouTube, Spotify and Apple Podcasts. The full transcript is down below: please note it was generated with AI assistance and may contain errors.
Pranav Agarwal: Ajay sir, thank you so much for coming and joining us. I started listening to your videos and podcasts sometime last year, when this entire situation in the US was starting. I think everyone else I was listening to was looking at it from a very myopic lens — Nifty, Sensex. And then I heard you talking about how we imported nail clippers. To see someone who understood trade with that degree of depth was absolutely fascinating. We’re extremely happy to have you on with us. Welcome.
Ajay Srivastava: Thanks a lot for inviting me.
Pranav Agarwal: I think it’s a very interesting thing to talk to someone who has been in your position, because I believe you spent your entire life working in international trade. For a long time, I imagine a lot of that was highly niche and highly specific — what does MFN status with such-and-such country require about HSN classification number so-and-so. And then suddenly, in just a few months, it’s become probably the most important thing happening in the entire world. What is this transition like for you?
Ajay Srivastava: That’s the biggest contribution of Mr. Trump. Trade used to be on the business pages — in fact, the last column of the business pages. He brought it to the front, and now most people talk about MFN. They understand MFN. A lot of trade jargon has become mainstream. That’s his spectacular contribution to trade.
Pranav Agarwal: In your entire career, until very recently, America was the leading pole of free trade internationally, and then somewhere around 2017 that started to get slightly derailed. And then last year, we’ve all seen what happened. Now, given that America was the ideological backstop for international free trade, and it has changed its mind — what happens to the rest of the world? Do you think someone else takes this mantle, or will the world just move away from free trade because America has vacated its spot?
Ajay Srivastava: The problem is — the last one year convinced me that America is the real, real superpower. Not in the positive sense I’m talking about. I thought countries had their own minds and they talked about whatever suited them. But the way things happened in the past year after Mr. Trump imposed tariffs, most of the big economies abjectly surrendered before Trump.
I have friends in Europe — I was talking to them. They said, ‘No, no, we’re not going to surrender. We’re going to negotiate a trade deal with him.’ But they surrendered. Japan — such a big economy, such a competitive economy — they surrendered abjectly before Trump. South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, forget about small countries. Except for China, Russia, and a few more countries, nobody was willing to even talk as equals before Mr. Trump. Everybody surrendered and agreed to abject terms in trade deals with the US.
That persuaded me that the US is a real, real superpower — not in the good sense, but they are the real one. Nobody stands before them. All these Europeans and Japanese — they may be good, but when it comes to America, they simply abjectly surrender. There is no one to take America’s mantle. China, of course, stands head to head, shoulder to shoulder with America, but nobody is willing to concede that China will become the global leader. China has to develop and work on many other areas before people recognise their strength. They are only a manufacturing superpower — they are not bigger in many other indices. So there is no one after America. It will be a vacuum, and that will be filled by more than ten countries.
Pranav Agarwal: It’s a very new world that we’ve entered. It’s extremely confusing, I think, sitting in India to even see a world like this. When I was younger, in college, what we understood was that the world had figured out trade, and it was just India’s job to match up with the world. Now that entire foundation has shifted under our feet.
In a very uncertain, fragmented world, how should India look at its options? I’m sure there are a lot of problems that will arise that did not exist before, and I’m sure there are also a lot of opportunities that a time of chaos like this throws up. If I am India, what picture emerges?
Ajay Srivastava: Three or four things. We have to keep our strategy very simple. First — all these disruptions are happening, so we have to enter into trade agreements with all our important trading partners. Once you negotiate a trade deal, you are assured of a certain tariff — zero percent, five percent, or ten percent — but you can predict it. It will be lower than what’s charged on most other trading partners. So one priority is trade deals with important partner countries.
Second, and more important than trade deals, is that we have to set our house in order. A country is globally as important as its military and its economics. Military — nobody is going to bomb us, so let’s focus on economics. China has become so powerful because they control thirty percent of world manufacturing. We have to work internally to become better manufacturers. We have to focus on specific actions to get there.
These disruptions will not affect us too much. Suppose you are not just an assembler of the iPhone but its inventor. You’re the inventor of products like iPhones or satellites. You own the IP. Then whatever is happening in the world, people will be buying your product. If we have a product, we have less to worry about global disruptions. I think this is the time we should focus totally inward and strengthen our manufacturing, our services — so many sectors we need to strengthen.
Pranav Agarwal: My fellow Pranav over here has a lot of questions on exactly that. But before that, I just wanted to get one more question on the wider world. Recently, the American Supreme Court gave the world a little bit of relief from the tariffs — a lot of people have been celebrating that the emergency tariffs have been struck down.
But now reading the papers, I’m seeing portents of darker things to come. There are all these Section 301 investigations that have been expanded far beyond anything previously imagined, and sixty countries have been dragged into fairly facile allegations. Sitting here, how should we look at the state of the world ahead after this first round of tariffs?
Ajay Srivastava: Let’s have a quick recap of what happened in the past one year. Incidentally, today is the one-year anniversary of Trump’s Section A tariffs — he imposed them for the first time on the second of April. So he came with the idea that he’d impose high tariffs on trading partners, then use those tariffs to intimidate countries into quick trade deals with the US. These high tariffs were violating all WTO rules, but Trump being Trump, he used one particular US act — the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. He used that, and he extracted trade deals.
The European Union, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia — almost everybody entered trade deals one after the other with the US. And the trade deals were so one-sided. For example, the European Union agreed Trump would lower its reciprocal tariffs from twenty-five percent to fifteen percent. In return, Europe would invest more than five hundred billion dollars in America, buy seven hundred and fifty billion dollars of energy products from America over the next three years, and eliminate tariffs on most American goods entering Europe. Similar obligations were taken by Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam — almost everybody. Totally one-sided.
From the US side, the wager was that they would reduce those reciprocal tariffs Mr. Trump imposed on April 2nd. Why were countries agreeing to this? Because the US is the largest market. Why do they buy the most? Because they can print dollars. They don’t have to earn dollars like other countries. They spend the most. So it’s the top export destination for most countries. People thought Trump may go after one or two years, so why disrupt our largest trading partner? Let’s keep selling to them. And they agreed to these one-sided terms.
But then things changed. On the 20th of February, the US Supreme Court held that Trump’s tariffs were not compatible with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. It said that act doesn’t empower him to impose tariffs, and that the imposition of tariffs is the sole responsibility of the US Congress, not the president. He cannot impose tariffs on the grounds of trade deficit, which he had used.
So that was a problem. And within hours of the Supreme Court judgement, the Trump team imposed ten percent tariffs under another section — Section 122 of the US Trade Act 1974 — uniformly on everybody in the world. Now, with the reciprocal tariff gone and everybody facing ten percent uniformly — whether you have a trade deal or not — what are the people with trade deals thinking? ‘I surrendered so much to Trump. I’m paying ten percent still, and the other guys didn’t have a trade deal. They’re also paying ten percent. So why the hell should I honour these trade agreements?’
That’s the thought going around. We in India haven’t completed the trade deal — we’re in the process of negotiating. We signed one elementary document called the Joint Statement on February 6th with Mr. Trump, where he said we’d be cutting tariffs from twenty-five percent to eighteen percent. Now that eighteen percent is gone — we also pay ten percent. So everybody is thinking: what’s the need for doing a trade deal when everybody is paying ten percent with or without one?
That’s the basic dilemma. And Malaysia walked out. Others are still thinking — Europe, Japan, everybody — because they cannot justify the trade deal to their domestic constituents anymore. So I think more walking out will happen.
America realised this, and Trump started threatening — in his State of the Union Address, I think in January or February — that anybody walking out of a trade deal will get bigger tariffs. He was simply intimidating the world like a bully. But they knew that plain intimidation might not work. So that’s where the Section 301 investigations entered.
The Trump administration initiated Section 301 investigations. Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974 empowers America to investigate any practices in partner countries that hurt American exports to that country. So America says it will investigate sixty trade partners — including Europe, Japan, South Korea, India, China, everybody — on whether they have overcapacity. Because overcapacity means they’ll be dumping their goods to the US. So for the US, if you are exporting, that means you have a surplus — that’s why you’re exporting. All the Ricardian theory — sent to the dustbin.
Second, he says you should not be using forced labour in your supply chains. The basic idea is to keep pressure on countries through Section 301 so they don’t walk out of the trade deal. But it pissed off countries very much. Suppose you are the European Union or Japan — you say, ‘My God, I surrendered so much in the trade deal. I’m still in the trade deal, but you’re still investigating me?’ So what is the certainty that tomorrow you will not impose more tariffs? The world is totally uncertain right now. And I think more people will take decisions like Malaysia. They just have to shed their fear of the American market for some time.
Pranav Agarwal: In all honesty, I was reading the Section 301 press release, and it is so absurd — it’s not even that you are using forced labour, therefore we are investigating you. It is that you are not doing enough to stop the imports of forced labour into your country, and therefore the US will investigate you. It is just naked bullying.
Pranav Manie: My question will sort of start from where you left off, which is the interim trade agreement that the US had with India. One of the tenets of the agreement — which has now, I guess, been scrapped — is that India would have to reduce or forgo imports of Russian oil. If you were a negotiator in an agreement of that sort with the US, how do you think about India’s sovereignty? That was one major critique levied on that agreement — that India let go of its national energy security. But did India even have another choice in that matter?
Ajay Srivastava: We’ve all been taught since childhood that we should take decisions that are good for the country in the long term, and not compromise on basic principles of goodness. I think we should have taken a straight decision — we should not have agreed to America, knowing fully well that much bigger powers than us, like Europe and Japan, had collapsed before America.
But my personal stand is that we should take a principled stand. We should not have agreed to that. We should have continued buying Russian oil. We should have said to America, ‘No, sorry. That’s our sovereign decision. We will continue buying from Russia.’
Today, fifty percent of our oil comes from West Asia — a disputed territory now because of war. Thirty-five percent last year came from Russia — also contested because of American sanctions and other things. So eighty-five percent of your oil is contested. In a country like India, where we import ninety percent of the oil we consume, eighty-five percent of that supply is disputed. We are already seeing this — just one month into this Iran war. We’re not a party to the war, but you see the impact on India across the streets. If the war continues, we’ll see the worst impacts.
We should be very strict when talking about energy security. Even if a small disruption occurs, given how import-dependent we are and how eighty-five percent of our sources are disputed — Russia is disputed, West Asia is under war — the first priority before the government should be to clean up our energy sourcing. We should tie up with Russia for long-term supply — say thirty to fifty years. We should contract at the special prices like we were getting earlier and tie up with other countries.
We should not be dictated to by America or anybody. We have seen what America is doing — just plundering oil here and there. They invaded Venezuela. Nobody — no European Union, no Japan — has the guts to even criticise that, forget about taking any action. We should act straight. If some loss is there, we should be willing to suffer it. But long-term interests of the country cannot be sacrificed.
Pranav Manie: That also leads to the next question I was going to ask. Understandably, let’s say we do not adhere to US demands. How do you view India’s actual position in the world, especially with respect to all the trade deals we’ve been signing? We signed a trade deal with the EU — one of the largest, I believe. In the past three years, we’ve signed deals with the UAE and Oman. How do you view these trade deals? What is the kind of win-win that India and the other countries foresee in that?
Ajay Srivastava: Before that, let me tell you what happened to India-US trade last year. Mr. Trump put fifty percent tariffs on us for many months last year. What happened to the trade? Monthly trade was down — if we compare December 2025 exports of India to the US with April 2025, exports were down by twenty-two percent. But if you look at the full year data — January to December 2025 over January to December 2024 — our exports grew by fifteen percent.
So all these tariffs — there were monthly variations, but annually we were all right. We grew by fifteen percent. We make a lot of noise. Media focuses on everyday events. But in the medium term, we were doing well. There were no real losses.
So I said we should not be too scared about any particular country taking absurd decisions. We should not compromise our long-term integrity for that.
Now, regarding your FTA questions — if I include the joint statement with the US signed on February 6th and the announcement that the India-EU FTA is complete, then India has completed twenty FTAs so far. Out of twenty, ten have been completed in the past five years only. That means we now have FTAs with almost all countries of importance, except probably China. Even with China, we have a small trade agreement called the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement, where we exchange tariff concessions on one-third of product lines.
We consider FTAs our top export promotion strategy. Initially, the FTA exercise was limited to East Asian economies — we did our first FTAs with ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea. Then we moved towards the western side in the past five years: UK, EU, Switzerland, Norway, and so many other countries. Both eastern side and western side, we have now completed this. We feel that FTAs will provide certainty — except for the US, every country honours its trade agreements. If they committed to zero tariff access on certain products, it will be ensured until we come out of the FTA, and that rarely happens. So FTAs will provide certainty for Indian exports to the world — except the US.
Pranav Manie: The one thing that both of us at Markets have been wondering is how we should understand India’s trade history of the last five years versus India’s trade history overall. After 1991, India tried export-led growth. It didn’t work in many cases. India signed many FTAs, most notably with a lot of Asian and ASEAN nations. And many of those FTAs didn’t work out, primarily — from what I understand — due to a lack of complementarity. How do you view what’s happening now against the backdrop of India’s general trade history?
Ajay Srivastava: Let me answer the question of complementarity. If you do an FTA with a country that produces similar things to you, there’s a problem. If they’re more competitive — say if I sign an FTA with China and make tariffs on garments or shoes zero — we both manufacture garments, we both export, but China makes better quality garments in many categories, particularly formals and synthetic garments. If we do an FTA and remove tariffs, they will swamp us. So complementarity is very important.
The other example is the FTA with the European Union — there we have near-perfect product complementarity. Europe is into upstream products. Belgium supplies rough diamonds — we import them, we polish them, and export worldwide. They supply electronic components — we use them to make assembled electronic products like smartphones and export to the whole world. They supply metal scrap — we buy it, make steel and aluminium rods, and export. Then we make labour-intensive goods. We process fuels — we import crude oil, convert it to petrol and diesel, and export it there. And we assemble things.
Europe is not into labour-intensive goods. They don’t process fuel. They don’t assemble goods. So if our exports to them grow after the FTA, European industry will not be hurt. What will happen at most is that they will start buying more from us and less from others — but their industry will not be hurt, and there will be value chain integration because we are buying raw materials from them in many cases.
Europe, on the other hand, is into high-tech, capital-intensive industries — high-tech pharma, high-tech medical devices that we don’t make. So when they come, and their exports to India increase, our industry will not be hurt. This product complementarity is a great part of doing an FTA with developed countries. I cannot say the same about a proper FTA with China.
Pranav Manie: Understood. And what is the sort of delta that you see with a trade deal? How much does a trade deal with, say, the EU move the needle in terms of economic growth? Could you help us visualise that in simpler terms?
Pranav Agarwal: To poke a little further on that — I think what we struggle to understand, as people just trying to understand how an economy works, is how much of a country’s trade position is just a matter of getting the basics right: industrial competitiveness, logistics performance, and so on. And what on top of that does a trade deal give — or not give?
Ajay Srivastava: I think this is the most important question. I wish we understood the answer in detail and in depth. This question is not discussed enough.
My take is this: trade agreements are just the periphery. If you have a good product, it will sell. Suppose we are the inventor of a great product — a satellite, a new kind of quantum computer, the next generation of smartphones. We own the IP. Or a new kind of fabric, a new kind of metal that can be used for medical equipment. Then we can charge a five hundred percent premium and it will sell. Apple charges more than a hundred percent profit margin on each of its smartphones — it sells, people buy, it doesn’t need to advertise much for this. The basic game is the product. If your product is good, a trade deal is fine, but it will go even without one.
China did not have a trade deal till 2000 with any major power, and they were already one of the largest exporters — maybe after Germany, I think they were the second-largest before joining the WTO — because of their product strength. They didn’t even have branded products then. They were just manufacturing products for European and American companies and selling. We don’t talk about these things. Our focus is mostly on trade deals.
Two things. We were very good, until about twenty years back, in labour-intensive goods — because raw material was available in India: garments, textiles, handicrafts, leather goods, low-end engineering goods, metals. We were very good. But now we are beaten in most labour-intensive goods by smaller countries. We don’t use technology in these areas.
Take garments. Our garment exports last year were about fifteen billion dollars worldwide. How much did Bangladesh export? More than fifty billion dollars. It’s not only because their labour is cheaper. Look closely: seventy percent of world garment sales are synthetic garments, mixed garments, sportswear, and winter wear. Our share in that seventy percent is very low. We are not focused.
Why? Because that category developed after the 1990s, and whatever product expertise we developed till the ‘90s has not improved much since then. We were very happy that we were liberalising, opening to the world, generating new entrepreneurs — but we have not looked into product development. That was the period when China was transforming its textiles, its electronics, its organic chemical industry, every industry. They were going to the basics and then transforming. It was all hard work. We didn’t do that hard work.
So the product profile we had pre-’90s still continues. Whatever products have been developed after the ‘90s, we are nowhere. Synthetic garments, electronics — we are nowhere. Because after the ‘90s, we stopped inventing things, stopped working on development. The whole thing became about trading.
Second — we are not doing deep manufacturing. If you want to make smartphones, you need to make components. If you want to make high-end televisions, you need to make the LED screens and everything. We don’t make any of those things. What we do is import everything, assemble it, add ten to fifteen percent value at most — not even twenty percent — and export it and take great pride. I say, okay, do that. It’s a good business practice, it earns some money, it will generate some employment. But be very clear that it is not a sustainable model. Some other country will replicate it immediately.
Some good things are happening. Apple making iPhones in India — right now, for advanced Apple phones, the import content exceeds ninety percent. But we’re seeing that many Indian firms have started making components, and we believe that in the next five to ten years, the local component content in smartphones will increase. But we need to do much more.
Take AI. We are the masters of the world in software exports, the largest exporter. Why are none of our top software firms talking about AI? Why do Sarvam or other AI models have to be startups by enthusiastic entrepreneurs? Why has no big money been committed by our top software firms to this? Why are they not developing their own models? They have the capability. They have the manpower and expertise. We need to talk about these things.
Most of our discussion is about trade deals. Those are peripheral things — they are needed, they help the country. But the basic focus should be on products. We were better than China in electronic hardware pre-’90s. We were exporting more APIs for pharmaceuticals pre-’90s than China. Now we are totally dependent on China, because post-’90s we have stopped talking and thinking about these things.
Pranav Manie: Funny you mention that — we had the founder of a printed circuit board company on a podcast on Markets earlier. Murali Srinivasa, based out of Bangalore. He said a lot of the same things. In the ‘80s and ‘90s, India had a PCB culture, and then it sort of wiped away. A lot of what you’re saying tracks in.
But very naturally, it leads to my next question. I think what you’re talking about is a disconnect between trade policy and industrial policy. In India, we don’t seem to talk about those two things together enough, even though they probably should be. It’s the coherence between them that led to China’s success — how they decide what to subsidise and what to protect, and how they export things. With India, we’ve had protection but without export discipline. We’ve also had liberalisation without building strong domestic supply chains. Do you think the recent push with PLIs — the electronics PLI being a success, the stuff we’re doing with EV schemes — are those more coherent pushes? Or are you seeing the same kind of disconnect?
Ajay Srivastava: For manufacturing, you need to go deep and you need time. If somebody has to start manufacturing, they have to acquire land, buy machinery, take approvals — it takes a lot of time in India. I’ve visited China many times and you see their plug-and-play ready industrial clusters where you just pay the rent and start operations within two or three weeks. That culture has to develop in India.
But I’ll say this: if we want to improve, we need to focus on three or four things — and we can do it.
I’m an engineer. Me and two friends would dismantle a bullet motorcycle once a year, all the way down to nuts and bolts, clean it up, reassemble it, and drive it. It took three to four days of around-the-clock work. But now I see in engineering colleges that the culture of doing things by hand is coming down. People are more focused on theoretical things, on IT and software. Even those doing electrical, mechanical, or civil engineering know less about the practical aspects.
My suggestion: one is high technology. Suppose you don’t have the technology to make semiconductor wafers — no problem. Those technologies are needed for less than ten percent of products. Today we import many specialised nuts and bolts used in automobiles, many such things. For ninety percent of items, we have the capability. We have to do a reverse engineering exercise in a massive way across the nation. We have to tie up with the top five hundred engineering colleges, give them two or three products and say, ‘Reverse-engineer these.’ We can reverse-engineer pharma molecules and recreate the drug at one-twentieth or one-hundredth the price. Reverse engineering of electronics and mechanical things is not going to be difficult for a country like ours. We have to do that. That will give us a lead in ninety percent of product lines.
For the ten percent where high technology is needed and we don’t have it, we need to follow the model like Suzuki. We invited Suzuki in 1983, and Maruti Suzuki was just a miracle. It not only produced cheap cars — it enhanced the productivity of India’s entire auto sector by two hundred and fifty percent in the next fifteen years. Everybody got competitive pressure. I think Apple will do the same thing. If everything goes well, in the next ten years we’ll have a good electronics ecosystem with thousands of firms making components and sub-assemblies.
We need more such firms. One was Suzuki, second is Apple — we need five or ten more in different sectors. For the ten percent where we don’t have technology, invite top anchor firms. That will lead to a lot of action on the Indian side — smaller firms will start supplying to them and then grow in the process. For the ninety percent, we have the capability. We just ignored it. It’s a shame that we import mechanical nuts and bolts and such things — we can do that. Somebody has to talk about these things. We talk about a lot of fancy stuff. Fancy stuff is fine, but we also have to talk about bread-and-butter stuff.
Pranav Agarwal: I want to shift gears and ask you about China. China is a country that is both very easy to be terrified of, and also, I think, the only country in the world that India can truly learn from, given its scale. If you open India’s markets completely to China — given China’s structural problem of oversupply — we will be flooded by Chinese products. So it gets very tricky to have good trade relations with China on that front. At the same time, a lot of the technology we need, a lot of the investment we need, a lot of the know-how we need — all of that sits in China. So how do you see our trade relationship with China, and how do we navigate all this complexity?
Ajay Srivastava: Of course, it’s absolutely in China’s favour — and I don’t see any problem with that given the current circumstances of how we manufacture high-cost things. Our exports to China are less than twenty billion dollars. Imports are one hundred and thirty-one billion. The trade deficit is more than one hundred and ten billion dollars with China — a very large trade deficit. We must do something about this.
But look at what we import from China. We import all industrial products. China supplies thirty percent of our industrial product imports — not only electronics, not only machinery, not only organic chemicals. In each of the top eight industrial product categories, China is our top import supplier. And most of these supplies are intermediates — they go further into our factories where we add value and make things. APIs: we make pharma exports everywhere. Electronic components: we make iPhones and export. So many organic chemicals. Machinery we use to make other things — textile machinery, other industrial machinery.
So while on the face of it the deficit looks bad, the goods we’re importing are absolutely needed in India. And except for a few chemicals, I don’t think they are being dumped — we import them because we need them.
Imports are high, but China is the top import supplier to almost all major countries. India is not the only one. India’s problem is not high imports. India’s problem is low exports. Our exports are less than twenty billion dollars — where they were five or six years back, with no growth. So we have to focus on exports. Why are exports not increasing? As we discussed, we make similar kinds of things and China’s are better. There is little scope for exporting to China, and most of what we import from them, we don’t make ourselves. So again, there is no competition.
They don’t supply us garments and such things — our tariffs check those imports. But we import all these intermediates. What should be done? We have to develop the industrial core of the country — go deep into manufacturing. We should not be happy with merely being an assembler to the world. We stopped developing products since the ‘90s. We have to start that culture. We have to re-energise our engineering colleges and the affiliated infrastructure. Right now, they are dormant — doing something else, not making things.
Pranav Agarwal: If we do want to be more competitive as a country, what should our top three priorities be to actually scale that difference?
Ajay Srivastava: The way I see it: talk about competitiveness with respect to a particular product. Suppose I want to make a glass tube in India. Who is my competitor? Say China. At what price is China making it? Suppose they are making it at one dollar per unit and we are at two dollars — we are one hundred percent more expensive. Where is that extra cost coming from? We have to see whether we are providing land at the right price, whether loans are available at the right price, whether we are using technology, whether we have scale.
And then there are other things — how fast do we refund GST paid, how much time does customs take? These things become so important. Take a simple product: gent’s cotton shirts. We are a great manufacturer. We are the biggest producer of cotton yarn — the best quality cotton yarn in India. But we don’t make high-quality cotton fabric. The cotton-yarn-to-fabric value chain is almost broken at the scale level.
If a firm like H&M or Zara wants to make a high-quality cotton shirt, they’ll buy yarn from us. They’ll ask us to supply that yarn from India to China, which will convert it into great quality fabric. But China is not the best at dyeing fabric, so the fabric will move to Spain for high-quality dyeing. Spain is a developed country — wages are high — so they cannot convert the fabric into garments. So the fabric moves to countries like Vietnam or Bangladesh, gets stitched, and goes to their ten thousand stores worldwide within one month.
Now, if I have to supply cotton yarn and a Chinese factory is waiting to convert it to fabric for export to Spain — if my customs takes four days, the entire cycle is disturbed. Similarly, if I’m importing something for processing here and it’s stuck at the port. Absolute smooth, uninterrupted movement must be ensured between factory and ship.
When we talk about competitiveness, it’s a fuzzy word. I don’t want to talk about it in general — I want to talk about a product. I want to track its movement from inception at the factory to the ship, or to the buyer, and then ask: where am I adding extra cost? I have to kill each of those costs. That’s how we have to do it.
I meet many investors. They say that if they’re making in Vietnam, their cost disability versus India is seven percent or ten percent. How are you going to meet that disability? One answer is: instead of announcing high-end schemes, we can also talk directly to top investors and top manufacturers, see what makes them uncompetitive in India, and try to fill that gap through whatever means.
There is no straight answer. We have to work at the product level. We need a lot of expertise, a lot of passion. This cannot be discussed at high tables. Somebody has to dirty their hands. We have people. We have passionate people. We just have to plan. We stop planning about all these things.
Pranav Agarwal: That is an absolutely fascinating answer. I want to move to a completely different topic. When I was in college, I studied law and was absolutely fascinated by the WTO. Back then — this was 2013-14 — it seemed like this was the next big thing, only going to grow from here. And then what actually happened is that ever since then, the WTO has just deteriorated in significance, and now in the fourteenth ministerial round, they can’t even close small agreements anymore. Could you help us understand what is happening with the WTO and how you see its future? Does it have a future, or is it a body that will fizzle out?
Ajay Srivastava: World trade in 1950 was about fifty billion dollars. Now it’s thirty-five trillion dollars. The precursor of the WTO was called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — GATT. It transformed into the WTO in 1995. Before that, GATT was mostly about negotiating tariff reductions. Then in 1995, we added more subjects.
What happened is this: trade grew from fifty billion dollars to thirty-five trillion — more than six hundred times, about six times faster than the growth of world GDP. A large part of that success can be attributed to the predictable trade rules set by GATT and the WTO. First, the WTO pressed all countries to lower their tariffs. Second, it said you cannot increase your tariff beyond what you committed in writing to the WTO. It made trade predictable. If I’m exporting to Spain, I know how much tariff there will be. And if Spain is charging ten percent on India for a glass tube, they have to charge ten percent on everybody else — except their FTA partners. A small entrepreneur, by knowing three or four WTO rules, could be fairly certain of the treatment they’d receive. WTO had a great contribution.
If one country can be credited with the success of WTO and GATT, it is America. America made the WTO what it is. Everybody gained — America gained, developing countries like India gained, everybody’s trade increased tremendously.
But now America feels that other countries have gained more. Since 2010, the feeling is there that they deliberately shifted their manufacturing to China — they thought China would be their lackey, their follower, their servant. But China developed its own independent mind and is faring better than America in many things — not only manufacturing but also technology, AI, supercomputers. In all the indices, they publish more high-tech papers. This gave America a complex, and they thought the trade system they set up is better for other countries like China or India. They have to somehow change the rules.
The basic rule of the WTO is that it has one hundred and sixty-six members, and a rule can be set only when all one hundred and sixty-six members agree. The benefit of this is that when setting an agenda, the membership comes from all kinds of development levels — rich countries, poor countries, developing countries. Some agenda items will benefit rich countries, some poor countries, some developing countries. It’s a mix — ultimately it has to be passed by everybody. If I’m a poor country and you don’t include my interest item, I will not allow your interest item. That’s called the consensus principle in the WTO.
Now these guys, especially America, feel the consensus principle is hurting. They want to bring in many new rules. We say bring in new rules, but take the approval of the WTO membership to initiate discussions. That they hate. They want to go solo with a group of countries. They want to convert the WTO from a consensus-driven one entity to a coalition-driven organisation. That’s their basic focus.
And as we discussed — if America says something, all the developed countries — the European Union, Japan, South Korea — without applying their minds, they will support America. For example, Ministerial Conference 13 of the WTO just ended two days back at Yaoundé in Cameroon. America’s full focus was that developing countries should agree to never tax digital transactions in the future. In the past, we have been giving a commitment that we won’t tax it for the next two years. The idea is that the whole economy is moving towards digital — wherefrom will revenues come after ten or twenty years? We want to keep options open for the future while extending the commitment for two years. America was very pissed off, and because of that there could be no decisions at the WTO.
What is happening at the WTO is that instead of being one body, the effort is to make it a coalition of countries through what are called plurilateral agreements. Some thirty, forty, or fifty countries come together, agree on a set of rules, and say, ‘Incorporate these rules into the WTO.’ Those who join will be allowed the benefits. Those who don’t join won’t.
Countries like India fear that if this happens, the issues of our choice — agriculture tariffs, agriculture subsidies, developmental concerns — developed countries will not be talking about those things. They will only talk in coalition terms. We say, if you want a small-group coalition type of thing, do an FTA amongst yourself. Why bring it to the WTO? There is no logic in that. Go outside, play your games. But no — they want to distort the WTO like this. That game is being played. So far they are not successful, but I think in the next two or three ministerials they are going to be successful, and the WTO may lose its identity unless something unforeseen happens.
Pranav Agarwal: That’s a very sobering note.
Pranav Manie: Depressing answer, I would say.
Pranav Agarwal: I want to shift tone now and ask you a couple of questions that are borderline personal. From what I could find online, you were part of the Indian Trade Service and would actually know what happens in the head of a trade negotiator. From the outside, because we don’t understand what a negotiator is thinking, we end up with all sorts of assumptions — who capitulated when, or why can’t they just ask for XYZ? But what actually happens in a negotiation? What is happening in the room? What is the thought process when you’re sitting across from a delegation from another country?
Ajay Srivastava: There is nothing fancy in the process. Everything is technical and highly detailed, and a lot of homework has to take place — as in most serious fields.
Trade negotiations — both sides decide which topics to cover. The basic topics are tariff cuts — how much tariff will be cut on my products — and you can include five or ten more subjects: services, investments, rules of origin, environment, labour, sustainability, and many others. But the core remains tariff cuts. I’ll describe that process, since that’s where I participated the most.
Suppose I am doing an FTA with Australia. I see what I export to Australia, what Australia imports from the world, and what I export to the world — what I have the capacity to export but am not exporting enough to Australia. What are the reasons? Is the Australian tariff hurting, or some other rules? Accordingly, I make a detailed list — that list relies on an Excel sheet containing Australia’s customs tariff schedule. Seven thousand lines. Against each line I say: ‘I am interested in this. Your current tariff is five percent — make it zero,’ or, ‘This rule is hurting us. Remove it.’ They do the same exercise for us. We exchange these lists by email.
Then both sides consider each other’s demands. Some things we consider sensitive. For example, if Australia says open wheat or pulses exports from Australia to India, we say, ‘No, it’s very sensitive. We are not going to allow this.’ Other things we don’t consider sensitive. They do the same thing. This happens over three or four months, three or four meetings — mostly through emails. We also meet once a month, alternating between countries. There, whatever doubts are there from the email exchanges, these are discussed. Australia will say, ‘I’m asking you to open this. You’re not allowing it, and this is not going to hurt you.’ I have to say the same thing.
After some time, there is agreement on ninety percent of the tariff lines. For the five or ten percent where there are disputes, it may be needed in some cases to escalate to the political level — as negotiators, we think it will not be good, but since the deal is important for India and we can live with this, we need to sound the political authorities. But that happens in very few cases. The rest is done at the negotiator level. A text is then agreed — how to implement this. Similarly, for the EU, we have twenty-four tracks or subjects. Similar exercises take place across all the tracks.
People have to be experts in their own areas. And while I’m discussing this, I’ll tell you — when I sat with my counterparts from the European Union, Japan, and South Korea, I learned a lot. They were knowing ten times more than I did. It was a very humbling experience, and it inspired me to learn more. You can never be too confident of yourself.
The amount of work they put in — they are supremely focused. For example, I was talking to one counterpart and I asked her, ‘When you go back after the negotiation, what do you do?’ She said, ‘I visit the factories. I see their industrial processes. I ask what kind of FTA rules are best suited for them.’ In our cases, we don’t have such liberties because we have to do a lot of other work.
And one more thing. About fifteen years back, whenever I was negotiating with China or Vietnam, their negotiators were not of very high quality. They knew their subject technically, but they were not very articulate. But when I met them last, six or seven years back in the RCEP negotiations, I found Chinese negotiators to be the best. Very articulate, very well educated, doing a lot of hard work. Same with Vietnam, same with many other countries. Countries develop their negotiating expertise over time — they focused on it. That’s what will happen to our manufacturing. If we focus on this, we are going to improve.

