The rupee has spent the last year doing the one thing it is guaranteed to do eventually, and everybody has watched it do so with a specific number in mind.
It was at ₹68 eight years ago and ₹85 last year; it ran from ₹89 up to ₹97 before settling back to ₹95, and every move drew the same headline question: when does it hit ₹100?
The RBI, for its part, has fired what Ananth Narayan calls a bazooka. This includes a subsidised swap window for FCNR(B) deposits and external commercial borrowings, carrying a subsidy of roughly 3% a year, designed to pull fifty to seventy billion dollars into the system over a few months. He means the word as a description rather than a criticism. His larger point is that the number everyone is watching is the least interesting thing in the frame.
Ananth Narayan spent most of his career on the other side of the screen: a currency and rates trader, latterly at Standard Chartered, before he took what he cheerfully describes as a midlife crisis into teaching at the SP Jain Institute of Management and then into three years as a Whole Time Member at SEBI, a term that ended in October 2025. He now writes a column in Business Standard (which we have also republished on Subtext).
He describes himself throughout this conversation as an armchair professor, mostly as a way of noting that he no longer has to be right about anything by Monday morning. So, on a Varsity Live session with a full audience, Nithin Sasikumar and Pranav Agarwal sat down with him after an earlier session in which he had walked the room through how money is actually created in a banking system.
He opens provocatively by telling the room that the level of a currency does not matter, and then spends the next hour on the one channel through which it does.
He walks us through the concept of reflexivity (which was defined by legendary trader George Soros) and how it informs the way self-fulfilling prophecies in currency markets come true, how gross FDI hit a record in the same years that net FDI fell to nearly nothing, why India has 15 crore equity investors and almost no corporate bond market, why India is the only major country that taxes foreign investors at source, and what three years inside SEBI taught him about the two kinds of error a regulator cannot avoid simultaneously.
The chain he keeps returning to runs like this: India holds down returns on debt, savings pile into equity instead, Indian assets get priced beyond what foreign investors will pay for them. The currency number that everyone watches comes at the end of that sequence rather than the start.
The last half-hour belongs to the audience, who asked the big-picture questions: how are India’s GDP numbers really calculated, whether we can ever stop importing key components from China, and what Trump is doing to the dollar.
Some of the things he said stuck with us. We’re sharing eight of them here.
On why the level of a currency does not matter
The rupee is the most watched number in Indian macro, and it is watched almost entirely as a scoreboard — a running tally of whether the country is winning. Ananth’s starting position is that this is a category error, and he opens with it deliberately, knowing exactly how the clip will travel. A currency is not a verdict on an economy. It is an output of one, and a fairly downstream output at that.
“Truth be told, levels of currencies do not matter. I know this will excite a lot of things if you just play this part out, saying, you know, levels don’t matter. But take Japan, for instance, or take any other country, China, for instance. What ultimately matters is how our standard of living is looking like, what our per capita income is looking like, what the GDP growth is looking like, what the capital formation in the country is looking like, and therefore what the prospects for the future are looking like. The currency is simply a number which kind of navigates through all of this — capital flows, savings, trade flows, and all of that. Ultimately, what should matter is how we feel. Is our purchasing power going up? Is our wealth going up? Is our income going up? That’s what matters.”
On self-fulfilling expectations in the economy
Having said levels don’t matter, he spends the rest of the conversation explaining the one channel through which they do. If enough people believe the rupee is heading to 100, their behaviour changes in ways that push it there. Importers pull purchases forward. Exporters sitting on dollars abroad wait. Anyone thinking of bringing capital in decides to bring it in later, at a better rate. None of this is irrational, and all of it is self-confirming. The name for it comes from a legendary trader who is also quite infamous for reasons other than trading — George Soros:
“He [George Soros] calls it — I think the book was called Alchemy of Finance — and he talks about reflexivity, where we tend to think as economists and as professors of markets as being determined by fundamentals. Our inflation is here, our growth is here, our GDP prospects are the following, therefore currency should be here. So George Soros said, there is something called reflexivity, where if I push the market far enough, it will start to determine the fundamentals rather than the other way around. So reflexivity is something you cannot ignore. So if the fear becomes of an uncontrolled spiral of the rupee, it can go to a level where it impacts fundamentals, stops capital flows from coming in, hastens imports and delays exports. So managing that is extremely important.”
On when the rupee actually gets to 100
Nithin asked the question the episode is named after, twice, and got an answer that comes in two parts. The first part is arithmetic and slightly deflating: in the forward market, where prices are set almost entirely by the gap between rupee and dollar interest rates, 100 has already happened. The two-year forward is through it. The second part is about what the RBI has just signalled it is willing to spend to stop the spot rate from getting there on a schedule set by sentiment.
“So if it’s about three rupees of forward premia, give or take, one year forward is already about 98. Two year forward crosses 100. Okay? Having said that, do I think 100 is going to happen in a hurry? Personal view, again — if you make money off it, remember me. If you lose money on it, this conversation never happened. It’s all AI. I don’t think RBI will let 100 happen in a hurry. The whole point of firing this bazooka was not to see 100 happen tomorrow. Unless dollar strengthens dramatically, Asian currencies collapse, and we are going in sync with the rest of the market, then it might allow it to happen. But I think clearly this bazooka has been fired to keep a lid on dollar-rupee. So I don’t think it’ll happen in two years’ time, but maybe five years’ time, yeah, sure, it’ll probably go there.”
On the rate cuts nobody connected to the currency
This is the sharpest thing he says, and he says it to an audience question rather than to the hosts. Between them, the MPC cut 125 basis points, the RBI bought ₹10 lakh crore of bonds through open market operations, paid a large dividend to the government, and held liquidity in surplus so short-term rates stayed low. Each step was individually defensible; inflation averaged 2% through FY26. His objection is not that the rate cuts were wrong. It is that the trilemma every macro student learns in their first week — you cannot have an open capital account, a managed currency and an independent monetary policy at the same time — was never brought into the room.
“So, you know, I was often asked this question, including on TV: should RBI use interest rates as a defence of the currency, right? This was in the June policy and so on and so forth. That’s a straw man question. It’s like saying, should you use a nuclear bomb now that the war is being lost, or whatever, right? The real debate to have, and the real thing to acknowledge or have a debate about, is that I think low interest rates during the course of FY25 and definitely FY26 had a big role to play in reducing capital flows and in creating weakness in the rupee. Now, it might be perfectly the right thing to do. All I’m saying, let’s debate it. If you look at the MPC minutes, if you look at the debates that happened with the folks in the RBI, there was never a debate on: did low interest rates have an offsetting impact on capital flows and currency markets?”
On why cheap money makes Indian assets too expensive to buy
The FDI numbers look contradictory. Gross FDI hit a record ninety-one billion dollars, and net FDI has been close to zero. Ananth’s reading is that both facts have the same cause, and it isn’t foreign disinterest. Suppress returns on fixed income through low policy rates and punitive interest taxation, and Indian savings have nowhere to go but equity — listed, unlisted, AIFs, family offices, all of it. Valuations rise. Existing foreign investors get excellent exits and new ones stay away, while Indian companies with cash discover that everything abroad is cheaper. The mechanism is easiest to see in a specific set of listings.
“Similarly for FPI and FDI in the listed space as well. Take the case of some of the Korean majors which did IPOs in India of their Indian subsidiaries. They were getting valuations in India seven or eight times higher than what they were getting in their own home country, right? So you had companies where India accounted for 5% of the global sales, but after the IPO happened of their Indian subsidiary, that Indian subsidiary accounted for 40% of their market capitalisation. Of course, I will issue stock. So unfortunately, what has happened is, I think a lot of money has flowed into our equity markets, both listed as well as unlisted, which makes it easier for foreign investors to exit than come in.”
On the tax that turns foreign capital away
India taxes foreign investors on capital gains at source. Almost nobody else does — the OECD model, and the practice of the US, UK, Japan and Singapore, is to tax the investor where they live. India’s justification was that double-taxation treaties would make the investor whole.
Ananth walks through four separate ways that fails: entities with zero capital gains liability at home have nothing to offset against; a fund’s withholding provision inside a NAV is not a tax receipt any foreign revenue authority will credit; gains computed in rupees can be losses in dollars, and are taxed anyway; and every single sale needs a Big Four certificate before the money can leave. He is careful to say fixing it would not by itself bring money in.
“So in reality, this is a huge negative for India. I’m not saying that if you remove this tomorrow, money will flow in — please don’t misunderstand. But it is definitely a negative which prohibits or inhibits money coming into India. And as a country which is starved of capital, as a country which needs capital formation, we have no business turning off capital and putting off capital like this. In a competitive global world where everybody is fighting for that pie of global savings for capital formation, we cannot afford to be outliers saying, ‘Oh no, you have to play by my rules to come into my country.’ You have to make sure that you’re at least on par with the rest of the world. So one thing that I’ve been kind of screaming about and losing a lot of hair about is exactly this, which is: can we please go into a residence-based taxation model, where foreigners do not pay tax here, they pay whatever tax they’re liable to pay in the overseas market.”
On why India has no corporate bond market
He answered this one by asking the room for a show of hands. Almost everybody had equity or mutual funds in their demat account. Roughly a tenth of that number had a corporate bond. The standard reading of this gap is that Indian retail investors have not yet been educated into credit, and that the fix is more product design and more regulation. Ananth thinks the demand is missing for a much simpler reason, and he reaches for fixed maturity plans — a genuinely popular fixed-income product that existed until the 2023 tax change and then stopped existing.
“But by and large, that was a good product, which was a fixed income product, and that innovation came because people demanded it. If you suppress that market, you will not get demand for that product. It’s very similar to saying, ‘I put a price control on a product,’ and then you’re saying, ‘Why is this market not growing?’ Arey, who the hell wants to supply at that price? So if you allow the corporate market, the debt markets, to be freer, I can guarantee you it’ll grow by itself. It will not require RBI and SEBI to break their heads and come with new regulations. You yourself will come up with new products which will cater to the demand coming from the genuine retail.”
On the two errors a regulator cannot minimise at once
Pranav asked what it is like to be the person actually holding the pen — to be sitting in the capital markets regulator’s chair in the years when an avalanche of household savings arrived, and to have to decide in real time which risks are catastrophes and which are just experiments.
Ananth’s frame is borrowed from statistics. A type I error is the disaster that happens on your watch, while a type II error is the good thing that never happens because you regulated it out of existence. Statistics says you trade one for the other. Regulation, he argues, is not statistics.
“But type I errors are when a disaster happens. So when a Harshad Mehta happens, or when a massive fraud happens, or a scam of some kind happens, you know, something like a Rajesh Exports happens — that’s a type I error for a regulator. And regulators hate type I errors, because that’s the time all of you will wake up and say, ‘What the hell were you doing?’ So none of us like to hear that, right? So for us, we are petrified of any type I errors. If there is a cybersecurity breach tomorrow, and God forbid, if all the data available in the depositories is made available in the dark web tomorrow, can you imagine what kind of a type I error that would be? So that is something which keeps us awake at night, right? At the same time, in our zeal to prevent type I errors, if we come with loads of regulations — you know, hundreds of pages of regulations saying, ‘Thou shall not do this, and thou shall not do this, and thou shall do this’ — then we make life extremely difficult for the good people to do capital formation, right?”
Some of Ananth Narayan’s writings:
Alternatives to intervention: the case for freer markets, fewer distortions
Intersections: Financial Markets and the Economy — his blog, where he archives every column
Books he mentioned in the episode:
The Alchemy of Finance, George Soros
Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, Ezra F. Vogel
Listen to the full conversation on YouTube. The transcript of the podcast is below.
The transcript below was generated with AI assistance and may contain errors.
Nithin: Ananth, thank you so much for doing this with us. You’re a former currency trader. You’re a SEBI official in your earlier stint —
Ananth Narayan: Former.
Nithin: That’s why I said in your earlier stint. And you have donned the professorial hat as well, which we have seen now with your complete explanation on the banking industry. But right now, over the course of the next forty-five minutes or so, Pranav and I want to go on a journey with you and hopefully take our audience and viewers into this as well — into understanding what is going on with the Indian rupee. Hopefully we’ll start with the very basics, so please ignore the silliest questions that we ask, as to why a currency even moves, to hopefully we’ll even try and get into, let’s say, the Mundell-Fleming trilemma as well, right? Which I think is a very interesting story in itself. So that is what we want to do over the course of the next forty-five minutes or so.
So to start off with, I think the question on my mind, and hopefully a lot of people’s mind, is the rupee at 100. Is that something that’s on the cards? And the backstory obviously is, I was watching an interview of yours, I think eight years ago, which you gave on one of the media channels. The rupee was at 68. Last few months haven’t been great from a macro perspective. Clearly the rising oil prices, the fact that we also have geopolitical tensions, and we don’t know what’s gonna happen to Iran oil and to oil prices in general. The fact that there are trade wars ongoing and India might be impacted, plus the overall sentiment globally, obviously impacts us all.
Pranav: To all your points — and I think you’ve made a fantastic summary of all the things which are besetting the currency markets at the moment — I would just add one more thing. You know, nobody likes a depreciating currency. It makes us all poorer in some sense. But everything else around it, that conversation, gave me a sense of déjà vu. There was a trade war happening, and there were fears that the currency depreciation was being overblown. And we have seen this trend through the years, right, where the rupee has fallen from 68 to 85 last year and to 95 where it is today. If the rupee perpetually depreciates against a currency like the US dollar, why should we be so concerned about the rupee hitting 100 today? Is that simply a psychological number, or does it have anything more at play deep inside?
Ananth Narayan: First of all, thank you so much, Nithin and Pranav, for doing this, and to Zerodha as a whole. I have to start with a caveat. I’m no longer a trader in currency markets. I’m an armchair professor, so I’m kind of cut off from what’s happening on the ground. I’m giving you a very, very different perspective, of a former trader and a former policymaker.
It’s actually a very good question. And by the way, there are no dumb questions when it comes to currency markets. Often the silliest questions expose the so-called experts like me, because we never have thought about it.
Truth be told, levels of currencies do not matter. I know this will excite a lot of things if you just play this part out, saying, you know, levels don’t matter. But take Japan, for instance, or take any other country, China, for instance. What ultimately matters is how our standard of living is looking like, what our per capita income is looking like, what the GDP growth is looking like, what the capital formation in the country is looking like, and therefore what the prospects for the future are looking like. The currency is simply a number which kind of navigates through all of this — capital flows, savings, trade flows, and all of that. Ultimately, what should matter is how we feel. Is our purchasing power going up? Is our wealth going up? Is our income going up? That’s what matters.
Having said that, what at least I have found through my trading days is that sentiment plays a big role in stable markets, and therefore in stable capital formation. Let’s hark back to the point when rupee moved up from 89 to 97 at one point of time. Now, of course, it’s come back a little bit. And everybody was saying 100 is on the cards, right? The problem with such a prognosis, where everybody starts saying that rupee is going to 100, is it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If everybody is rushing in to buy dollars because you expect dollar-rupee to go up, anybody who’s looking to bring in capital flows will say, “Hang on, let me wait,” because I don’t know if my rupees is going to go weaker and therefore I bring it at the wrong time. Exporters who are sitting with dollars overseas will say, “Let me wait.” Importers might rush in to say that, “Let me take out dollars and buy whatever I have to buy right now, before the rupee becomes even weaker.”
So there is this very nice book by George Soros — a much abused and much maligned trader of the past, and he’s one person who was famous in the currency, infamous in the currency markets, for having taken on the pound sterling. He calls it — I think the book was called Alchemy of Finance — and he talks about reflexivity, where we tend to think as economists and as professors of markets as being determined by fundamentals. Our inflation is here, our growth is here, our GDP prospects are the following, therefore currency should be here. So George Soros said, there is something called reflexivity, where if I push the market far enough, it will start to determine the fundamentals rather than the other way around.
So reflexivity is something you cannot ignore. So if the fear becomes of an uncontrolled spiral of the rupee, it can go to a level where it impacts fundamentals, stops capital flows from coming in, hastens imports and delays exports. So managing that is extremely important.
Pranav: So I mean, the current depreciation of the rupee is one thing, but generally in India, there is a fear of the rupee getting too weak. And there is this general narrative that we rely on imports for all our energy, et cetera. So whenever the rupee goes too weak, we are in trouble. And then you hear narratives from other countries, right? So the West — the allegation that they hurl at a lot of the industrial powers from Asia, like China, Korea, et cetera, is that these guys are sort of suppressing their own currency so that their exports prosper. And that sounds equally convincing, that the more you push your currency down, the better your exports look like in the world markets. So what are the trade-offs of where your currency is valued in general? And what exactly are you trying to achieve when you’re trying to sort of think about where the rupee should be, as, let’s say, the government?
Ananth Narayan: Look, the ultimate goal for a country like ours — it’s eventually about ensuring that we have enough growth in the economy, and it’s an equitable growth, so that the per capita income goes up not just at the extremities, but also as a median per capita income going up, right?
Reality also is that for many years now, for decades now, India has had a problem of underemployment. So by the way, there’s something called the labour force participation rate — LFPR. This is something which is official statistics as well as World Bank. If you look at the World Bank website, the databank, it gives you for different countries. I don’t remember the numbers offhand, so pardon me if it’s off by a few percentage points here and there. India’s labour force participation rate is about 55% of the population between the ages of 15 to 64. That’s the critical age that we look at, right? The average for the world, and take Vietnam, for instance, is 80%. China is around 75%. The average for the less developed countries and the emerging markets and the growing markets, et cetera, is around 65, 70%. Within this, women’s participation for India is about 35%, give or take. In Vietnam, it’s 75%.
So one of the biggest challenges that we have today is being able to employ our people a lot more. We, after all, have a demographic dividend. Our median age is 29 years or so. There’s this vast population of lots of Gen Z people who are looking out for jobs. And by the way, only 50% of our graduates are employed, right? Many of them choose not to go into employment. Many of them don’t get employment, right? So our biggest goal is, we need jobs and we need output and we need growth. Our per capita income at $3,000 is too low. We have a long way to go, right?
So everything else is a means to getting this done. How do you increase employment? How do you increase growth? How do you increase per capita income? Now, what are the input factors around currency markets, interest rate markets, capital markets, et cetera, which allow for this to happen, is one question. But the bigger question is, the stumbling block is probably not the financial markets, it’s probably the real economy. So we should be having — and I’m sure you’ll have a lot more of discussions with — why is it that despite having such a large employable population... By the way, the number of engineers coming out of India is, I think, second to China in the world, right? So despite having such a large, intelligent, fire-in-the-belly, aspirational young population, why is it that our jobs are not being created?
I suspect the issues would be to do with things like land acquisition, ease of doing business at the local level, at the state level, at the central level. It would be to do with labour laws. It would be to do with how many babus are involved in the decision-making process for setting up a new company. So a lot of real economy issues which actually come in the way, which countries like China have sorted out over the last thirty, forty years.
Having said that, it’s not to say that financial markets don’t matter. Ultimately, the currency rate which facilitates job creation is what matters for us. That facilitates GDP growth is what matters for us. That becomes a function of what amount of capital do we need to attract, and how much of current account surplus or deficit can we have.
Now, one of the issues in determining that right rate is what I talked about earlier. We tend to talk about currency markets in isolation, and you mentioned Mundell-Fleming and the impossible trinity, et cetera. The reality is everything goes together, and you cannot look at currency markets in isolation without looking at least at interest rate markets. So the problem is we have repression in our interest rate markets, and then we worry about, oh my God, why is currency markets doing what it’s doing? I suspect allowing markets to be a lot more freer, both on interest rates and currency markets, would actually allow the markets to determine where the rate should be, such that growth comes at the right level and such that job creation happens at the right level. But this is only one part of the problem. The bigger part of the problem is probably this real economy issue of ensuring that job creation at the ground, in terms of ease of doing investments, ease of doing business, all of that gets sorted out first.
Pranav: Okay. So reflexivity is one of my favourite things to talk about as well. So I do want to understand, because you said it’s something that policymakers — if I got it right — policymakers need to keep in mind. But are they actually thinking of reflexivity when they are working with the currency market, or anything to do with policy, but also with everything else that you mentioned in the labour market? Because all of this can also lead to reflexivity playing out in the real economy.
Ananth Narayan: Yeah, there are plenty of moving parts. I do think policymakers do consider reflexivity. For instance, a topic of big discussion can be, did we really require the special swap on the currency market today, right? So the RBI, as you know, has offered this subsidised swap window for FCNR(B) deposits, for ECBs being raised — external commercial borrowings being raised by public sector enterprises and by banks as well, right? It’s a very steep subsidy. It’s about 3% per annum of subsidy, which is gonna cost a lot of money, right?
Now, question is, was it required? And it’s a controversial question which can have multiple answers. But to my mind, it reflects part of the fact that they had reflexivity in mind. They had to break the cycle of the sentiment being so negative that things were getting into this vicious spiral. So by actually offering this bazooka of a subsidised swap, and showing that I’m gonna get fifty, sixty, seventy billion dollars over the next few months, you are demonstrably trying to arrest the fall in the sentiment, and therefore bring some stability into the market, and therefore breaking the reflexivity in the cycle, right?
So that’s the part about the financial markets. You make an excellent point about reflexivity in things like the real economy as well, and this is complicated. There are people who understand this far better than I do. For instance, there is plenty of paper and literature to suggest that all the cash direct payments being made by state governments — multiple, I think there are seventeen states now which are offering various kinds of love to sisters and so on and so forth — that’s not doing anybody any favours in terms of actually improving the quality of the labour force available for actual productivity and capital formation.
Having said that, look, we can’t beat ourselves also too much. We are a growing young economy. We will invariably make mistakes. And if we agonise over every single thing and say, this is not correct, and we will go for perfection, it ain’t never gonna happen. You know, I’m reading this book about China, Deng Xiaoping. In fact, I think Nikhil Kamath had tweeted about this, and that’s how I got to know about this book. It’s a tome of a book, nine hundred pages. But it’s amazing to see how China made the transition from being completely butchered after the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. And then they had to pivot towards this market economy where they allowed manufacturing to grow, they allowed the intelligentsia to come back again and start to create value for the economy. And that happened under Deng Xiaoping. And they started off from a place which was a hundred times worse than we were ever in, and yet they managed the transition.
I think for us that will be the crucial part. How do we ensure that the real economy actually grows, where young people are able to create value, are able to create new businesses, are able to create the middle sector which, for instance, Germany created, and therefore leads to economic growth. You know, we can talk all we want about currency markets, interest rate markets. Frankly, financial markets will not matter at all if we get our basic economy right. That is kind of a secondary consideration once the...
Pranav: So a good strong core economy can make up for all the faults in the financial economy. A strong financial economy cannot make up for the faults in the real economy. I think Deng Xiaoping’s famous line is that you must cross the river by feeling the stones under your feet. And I think part of that is that you shouldn’t flinch every time you feel a sharp stone. So that is what we’re feeling. I don’t think it’s that big of a problem.
But I think one of the big conversations around this is, why are we not getting enough foreign direct investment, right? And we’ve seen lately statistics where FDI in some years has been practically zero. But then you open up those statistics and suddenly everything gets extremely confusing. So you have gross FDI, which is quite robust. I think last year we hit an all-time high of something like ninety-one billion dollars. Then there are people who are taking money out, but that is the very purpose for which you invest, to take money out. You are also seeing these really interesting phenomena of Indian companies investing abroad. And, you know, so when I actually sat on the RBI website and tried to understand the statistics, nothing really made sense to me. So I was hoping, could you open this up for us and help us understand what the foreign direct investment picture actually looks like?
Ananth Narayan: So when you find the answer, let me know as well. But I’ll tell you my take on this. By the way, nothing is a univariate equation. It’s complicated. Of course, questions about what is India’s AI story, what is our growth story, are we doing enough in the frontier new technologies — all of those are questions which have to be answered as well for FDI.
I’ll tell you what I think is happening. So you’re absolutely right. Gross FDI is looking fantastic. And by the way, when I was in SEBI, and even now as an analyst for Observatory Group, which is a global macroeconomic research forum, I speak to a lot of investors who like India. It’s not as if... So they’re not necessarily coming in and bringing a lot of money into India, but they genuinely like the growth story they think India has got, and they like the young people in India. They think there’s a lot of potential for growth in India.
But I go back to this point about valuations. One concern which I’ve heard over the last two, three years is that your assets are too richly priced. And I go back to what we discussed. If all of us as a community are putting too much money into the equity markets because we don’t see any other viable alternatives, and we’ve all been told that mutual funds sahi hai, and we don’t pay enough attention to the fine print which comes saying mutual funds are subject to market risk. And if all this flood of money is going in and pushing up the valuations in the market...
By the way, it’s not just in the listed space. If you look at the unlisted space — ultra high net worth individuals, family offices, and through alternate investment funds — there’s a lot of Indian money, domestic savings, going into the unlisted space as well. You will hear of lots of trades happening in the unlisted space, right? Now, both in the unlisted space, in the typical private equity startup, and in the listed space, valuations have gone up dramatically. What does that mean? For a SoftBank or a Warburg Pincus who’s come in ten years ago, they’re getting a fantastic exit, as you rightly mentioned. After all, you want to exit as well, and you’re getting brilliant exits by doing an IPO or by selling off to somebody else who’s doing a private equity deal. And you love the valuation, you love the company. But if you’re getting a valuation which is higher than what you think it ought to be, great.
Similarly for FPI and FDI in the listed space as well. Take the case of some of the Korean majors which did IPOs in India of their Indian subsidiaries. They were getting valuations in India seven or eight times higher than what they were getting in their own home country, right? So you had companies where India accounted for 5% of the global sales, but after the IPO happened of their Indian subsidiary, that Indian subsidiary accounted for 40% of their market capitalisation. Of course, I will issue stock. So unfortunately, what has happened is, I think a lot of money has flowed into our equity markets, both listed as well as unlisted, which makes it easier for foreign investors to exit than come in.
Secondly, it also has an implication for domestic investors. So think of a family office, or of a company which has a lot of money to invest. If you think that the valuations in India are very high, why would you do a greenfield acquisition or a brownfield acquisition here? Why would you buy a company in an inorganic acquisition here, when you can get something much cheaper overseas? So why is overseas direct investment going up? It’s the same phenomenon. If the valuations in India are too expensive, I would rather invest overseas.
So I go back to my point. I think it’s extremely important that we allow our capital markets to be efficient, and free markets are a route to efficient markets. Our equity markets are free, don’t get me wrong, but our interest rate markets are not free, and that is pushing too much money into our equity markets, and that by itself puts off both foreign investments as well as domestic investments.
So to answer at least my interpretation of the numbers you see on the FDI — yes, gross FDI is good, reflecting the fact that India has a good story. But because our valuations in equity markets, both unlisted and listed, are very, very high, at least in pockets, if not entirely, foreigners find it easier to exit. Domestic participants find it easier to invest overseas. Of course, our net will look on the wrong, lower side.
Pranav: I actually wanted to double-click on your thesis on debt investments being sort of unattractive. I mean, there is of course sovereign debt, and you covered that quite beautifully. But one thing that has always puzzled me is, why does India, one, not have an active corporate debt market, and two, why is it not coming up despite several measures that we saw over the last few months? What is it that’s keeping that segment of the market from forming?
Ananth Narayan: So let me do a quick show of hands here. How many of you have demat accounts in which you have either mutual fund units or single stocks, individual stocks? Quite a few. How many of you have corporate bonds in your demat accounts? About one-tenth of that number for equities. By the way, all of you deserve a prize from the RBI and SEBI.
But let me start off with the basic principle. Why is it that equity markets are doing so well? Because you have plenty of people, as I mentioned, 15 crore people right now who are invested in equity markets. We did a survey in SEBI when I was there in SEBI last year. This was a fantastic survey, around ninety-three thousand households. And what we found is that 63% of India’s households are aware of equity markets. Only nine and a half percent actually have investments in the equity markets, but 22% of those who are aware but not invested want to invest over the next one year. So I can guarantee you, between Zerodha and all your competitors, between all the exchanges, you will have plenty of work to design new products on the equity side, because there is a fundamental demand coming in from the people saying, “I want equity risk.”
Where are you seeing the demand for credit risk? Tell me, do you see droves of people coming and telling you, “I want corporate bonds — triple-A corporate bond or double-A corporate bond or whatever”? And I go back to my point. If you have financial repression in two forms. One, we have this clamour for keeping interest rates down, so RBI dabs the interest rate down. Two, we have taxes on interest rates, which are prohibitively higher compared to equity markets. You and I are least interested in investing in fixed income. So if you don’t have the ground demand for paper on corporate bonds, how will that market develop? You can do all you want. You can beat whichever dhol you want, but there’s gonna be no impact.
The best way to allow this market — it’s not that corporate bonds are bad. I am telling you, you remove the tax problem that you have on corporate bonds. You remove this repression which happens through multiple routes, by this clamour to keep interest rates down. I am telling you, a lot of people in this room will say, “Boss, I want fixed income products.”
I’ll give you an example. Remember we used to have these fixed maturity plans in mutual funds till 2023, until the tax rule was changed? And that was a genuine product which people had a demand for, because it was a great way on a post-tax basis to get decent returns on fixed income products. Of course, there were problems. We had some defaults and all of that happening as well. But by and large, that was a good product, which was a fixed income product, and that innovation came because people demanded it. If you suppress that market, you will not get demand for that product. It’s very similar to saying, “I put a price control on a product,” and then you’re saying, “Why is this market not growing?” Arey, who the hell wants to supply at that price? So if you allow the corporate market, the debt markets, to be freer, I can guarantee you it’ll grow by itself. It will not require RBI and SEBI to break their heads and come with new regulations. You yourself will come up with new products which will cater to the demand coming from the genuine retail.
Pranav: But does this affect the currency — the lack of demand in the debt side, but the exploding demand on the equity side? On one hand you have FPIs who are leaving the country, and you have DIIs who are buying into the equity markets despite the high valuations. How does this play... And you’ve mentioned also the RBI keeping interest rates low. How does all of this play together into deciding the level of the Indian rupee?
Ananth Narayan: Right. Great question. So couple of ways. One, if you keep interest rates low — and by the way, when I say interest rates low, what I mean is the following: interest rates are not being decided by my supply of money going into fixed deposits or credit products. It’s being kept at a rate lower than where I would want the fixed deposit rate to be, and it’s being kept there by RBI buying bonds, by RBI keeping interest rates low on the policy side. And even today, banks are struggling to get fixed deposits from all of us at the rates which are there right now. So when I say keeping the rates low, it sounds judgmental, but I’m simply saying the rates are not decided by genuine market demand and supply. It’s being decided by something else.
If the rates are suppressed, and I think they are suppressed — first of all, foreign money into debt struggles to come in. By the way, now we’ve had $6 billion of foreign money coming into debt markets after the change which happened in June, on June 5th, where you had an ordinance set up by the government which removed the taxation on FPIs bringing in money into debt. It tells you — effectively that ordinance increased the net return for foreigners by some 70, 80 basis points.
Pranav: Sorry, I have to ask. Was that also a case of reflexivity in action?
Ananth Narayan: It was a case of solving for an aberration. You know, India was the only market which applied withholding tax on foreigners on their investments in India. So the global OECD norm, by the way even for equities, not just for debt, is that if I as an Indian resident, Indian passport holder, invest in the US, invest in UK, invest in Singapore, invest in Japan, I do not pay capital gains tax in any of those countries. I pay capital gains tax in India based on the returns I file in India. India is the only major country, besides maybe Indonesia, which says that foreigners have to pay tax here. But let’s keep that aside.
Coming back to your original question. So foreigners struggle to bring in money because the rates look on the lower side. And then the point I made — because rates are low, and because therefore DIIs and retail put a lot of money into equity markets, equity markets look overvalued, and that actually pushes out foreign investment. So in a funny way, this interest rate suppression overvalues the equity markets, and therefore throws out foreign investment and doesn’t allow it to come in, and that creates an FX problem. So it’s a nice circular kind of a loop which is completed by this entire prognosis.
Pranav: I just wanted to sort of invite you to talk a little more about the policy choices that affect an FPI’s decision. Because I think unlike an FDI investor, an FPI is only looking at the numerical rate of return. So I think anything that impacts the numerical rate of return will fundamentally affect their choices. Anything that impacts their ability to take money out will also impact their choices. So could you just build for everyone here what the policy matrix around FPI investments is, and where are the distortions?
Ananth Narayan: So a few things which we’ve got right over the years. We’ve never come in the way of FPIs taking out money. Never have we imposed any kind of capital controls, ever, either directly or indirectly, on people taking out money, and FPIs are aware of that. So we’ve opened up for FPIs for the last three decades now, since the late ‘90s. Never have we come in the way of saying, “No, you can’t take out money.” Okay? And that’s, I think, very, very good.
I’ll tell you where the distortions are, which are kind of worrisome. I mentioned this in the previous question that Nithin asked as well, which Sagnik then asked as well, which is: India is the only country which applies this source-based taxation on capital gains from equity markets and from corporate bonds, and earlier till recently on government bonds as well.
Let me explain what that means. If a foreign investor sitting in New York or wherever, if she invests in India and when she sells a security, she has to figure out what is the total gains that she’s made in rupees. If it’s long-term capital gains, she has to pay 12.5% capital gains tax along with surcharge, close to 15%. Pay that, only then can she remit the money out to New York.
Now, India did this thoughtfully, and by the way, India is the only country that says you have to pay tax in India. As I mentioned earlier, any of us who are Indian citizens investing in US, UK, Japan, Singapore, we do not pay tax there. We only pay tax in our country of residence. This is an OECD model. It’s an OECD recommendation saying that everybody shall be charged capital gains tax on a residence-based model. You pay in your country of residence. You do not pay in the source, you pay in the residence. India is an aberration.
Now, the way India justified this is by saying, “I will have double tax avoidance agreements with all countries, so that the end investor is not impacted. So you will get a set-off of whatever you pay here against whatever you’re liable to pay in your home country, and therefore you have no problem. You’re not paying additional tax.” This looks great, and by the way, India signed DTAAs with multiple countries. This looks great in theory. In practice, it fails.
I’ll tell you why. First, many entities are exempt from capital gains tax completely. Sovereign wealth funds, Harvard endowments in the US, right? Entities based in Singapore, they have zero capital gains tax. Now, if you have a withholding tax in India, what do they set it off against? That’s the first problem.
Second problem: assume Bill Gates invests into India via a fund, via Jardine Fleming Fund, okay? Now, he is liable to pay 20% capital gains tax in the US. That’s his tax bracket, so that’s fine. But when he withdraws money from the Jardine Fleming Fund, the fund will give him a provision for withholding tax as part of his net asset value, NAV. So it will give him a less number and say, “I’ve set aside so much as a provision for paying withholding tax.” Bill Gates goes back to the US, he shows this provision for withholding tax, he can’t get a credit against it. The US tax authorities will say, “What the hell is that provision? Show me the actual tax paid.”
Third issue: the gain that we calculate for Bill Gates or for whichever entity is in rupees. So they have to pay capital gains tax, withholding tax, in India on a rupee basis. In dollars, in euros, in sterling, they could have a loss, and yet they are deducted a gain, a withholding tax in India in rupees. What do they set that off against?
Finally, fourth issue. Imagine that if you’re a global fund, a Morgan Stanley fund, or any other fund, okay, a Vanguard fund or whatever. Every country in the world has a certain process. India is the only one where for every sale you have to get a Big Four to give you a certificate saying so much of tax to be paid. You have to make that payment to the Indian tax authorities, only then you can take out the money. Can you imagine the operational nightmare you have to go through to pay this tax?
So in reality, this is a huge negative for India. I’m not saying that if you remove this tomorrow, money will flow in — please don’t misunderstand. But it is definitely a negative which prohibits or inhibits money coming into India. And as a country which is starved of capital, as a country which needs capital formation, we have no business turning off capital and putting off capital like this. In a competitive global world where everybody is fighting for that pie of global savings for capital formation, we cannot afford to be outliers saying, “Oh no, you have to play by my rules to come into my country.” You have to make sure that you’re at least on par with the rest of the world.
So one thing that I’ve been kind of screaming about and losing a lot of hair about is exactly this, which is: can we please go into a residence-based taxation model, where foreigners do not pay tax here, they pay whatever tax they’re liable to pay in the overseas market.
Now, this is not easy. As I said in my talk as well, armchair professors like me can give gyan. The policymaker sitting in Delhi and RBI has to think of a hundred things. One of the issues is, what happens to my collections that are going on tax? Anyway, I’m struggling for my fiscal balance. So what happens to the tax revenues I lose? Second, there are funds which make a lot of money making markets as high-frequency traders, on which, by the way, they pay 30% tax, and a lot of it is, you can argue, for short-term trading on very, very liquid contracts. Do you really wanna give them a tax break as well, by giving a blanket exemption?
One way to address both of these issues could actually be to increase STT. Now, I’ll get beat up for saying this, but I’m saying increase securities transaction tax, particularly on the more liquid contracts, which are, let’s say, the index options, et cetera, to compensate for this. And it will not cost too much, because the gains that you actually get on capital gains is not that much.
So all I’m saying is, this is an aberration which needs to be sorted out for FPIs. Now, does this mean if we go into a residence-based model tomorrow that automatically FPIs will start pouring in money? No, not at all. But is it a necessary condition for FPIs to start coming in a big way? Absolutely. It’s not a sufficient condition.
Nithin: Let me ask a question that has been on my mind since you were talking about the banking space itself, when you spoke about the RBI absorbing FDI flows and building the forex reserves. Here we are in a situation where FPIs are leaving the country, FDI money is also leaving the country, as we discussed. Number one, how does the RBI actually, in such a scenario, keep building the buffer on forex reserves? But number two, I think more interestingly, is how much is too much? We are at, I think, roughly six hundred and eighty odd billion dollars today. We had reached seven hundred and thirty billion a while ago. It’s come down. So essentially, how much is too much, and in a situation like this, how does the RBI actually keep attracting and building that buffer?
Ananth Narayan: Sure. Look, since the turn of the century, since the year 2000, very broadly the balance has been as follows. We’ve had a 2% of GDP of current account deficit on average every year. Our capital flows have been slightly more than 2% of GDP. So net effect, actually money comes into the ecosystem, and RBI has been able to build its reserves over a period of time thanks to this balance. Okay?
The second thing you have to remember — remember that when RBI is holding reserves, it’s also earning interest on those reserves. So it’s not sitting with those dollars and doing nothing. It’s deploying them into US treasuries, into euro bonds, and so on and so forth. So it earns interest on that as well. So that again accretes to the reserves. It has bought gold. Gold has gone up in value quite dramatically over the years. So that’s again accreted to the reserves as well. So there have been both net inflows as well as accretion of the reserves, because you earn on the foreign currency reserves that you hold.
Now, obviously there are leads and lags, so you will have some years where you have a lot of inflows. In fact, during COVID, that FY21, RBI I think had to absorb eighty, ninety billion dollars, or maybe even a hundred billion dollars, because that was a net inflow which came, and we stopped buying oil and suddenly our trade deficit came down dramatically. So there are some years where they absorb a lot of dollars, and some years, like the last two years, where they supply dollars.
One small correction: FDI was not negative. Net FDI actually was, what, $7 billion positive. Of course, there was a big gross number and an outflow as well. FPI was negative. So across FPI and FDI, the two put together was negative.
Now, how much is the right number is a great question, and I go back to your favourite topic of reflexivity. Eventually, you need reserves to give confidence to the ecosystem that you cannot push the pendulum too much to one side or the other, right? So what that number is, is not a static number. But there is research on this. So IMF, I think, says 10 months of imports. There was a paper, or a report done by Dr. Bimal Jalan, which also suggested 11 months of imports. But those are all thumb rules. Eventually, the right number is what gives confidence to the market that you cannot have a run on the rupee.
So even today, with whatever the number is, $680 billion, less forward sales of $104-105 billion, people are now confident — rightly or wrongly, but confident — that the rupee will not fall in a hurry right now, because RBI has, as I mentioned, fired a bazooka of having this swap, and obviously it’s trying to shore up reserves, which means it’s very clear it’ll use those reserves to protect the rupee. Now, therefore, this reserve is enough right now, because people will not take on the RBI right now, right?
So ultimately, it’s a question of trying to figure out what the sentiment looks like. And how do you figure that out? As I mentioned, in the last two years it was very obvious that the demand for dollars was not coming from actual core current account deficit or FPI outflows. It was coming from sentiment. When I mentioned $117 billion was the net demand coming purely from sentiment, that gives you a sense that sentiment was going for a toss. US reserves is nothing. US has gold, but it doesn’t really hold foreign currency. But nobody’s gonna have a run on the dollar, because there’s confidence that that system can handle itself, right?
Nithin: Sorry, can I just ask you to explain something that you said? So $680 billion of reserves, and you said 100 odd in forward as well. So net is 580 roughly. What exactly is that forward, and why does that bring it down to 580? And what should the number be actually when we are looking at it? Should we be looking at 580, or should we be looking at 680 and patting ourselves on the back?
Ananth Narayan: Again, a great question. Sometimes the RBI chooses to intervene not by selling in the spot market, but by selling in the outright forward market, right? So for instance, if there’s a dramatic demand for dollars going through the ecosystem, and it does not want to show a dramatic drop in currency reserves, it might sell in the forward market.
The other problem when it sells in the spot market — remember, and I showed that in the banking equation, when the RBI sells dollars, it will draw out rupees from the banking system. So the rupee liquidity comes down dramatically the moment you sell dollars in the spot market. On the other hand, if you sell in the forward market, nothing really happens to the rupee liquidity immediately. So if you want to preserve rupee liquidity and you don’t want the market to panic by seeing a sharp drop in the reserves, selling in the forward market sometimes makes sense.
Now, if you’re selling in the short run — in three months, six months, one year, which is normally the tenure of the sale by RBI — then mentally you have to knock that off, knowing that this is a liability which is going to come up. Either the RBI will have to roll forward that sale, or it’ll have to make good that sale and actually supply the dollars from the reserves. But in the case of the special swap that is announced now, for FCNR and ECB, et cetera, it’s three to five years. Which means the liability is there, but it’s between three and five years later. So there’s no immediate gun on the head. And between now and three to five years, lots of things could change. So it’s not an immediate liability as far as people are concerned.
So in a way, it’s comforting that we have bought ourselves time for three to five years, that RBI does not have any liability coming up now for the incremental dollars it gets through the swap scheme. In the meantime, we have plenty of time to address why FDI is not coming in, why FPI is not coming in, how can our goods trade deficit come down, all of those issues. So we bought ourselves time to solve the real issues by doing the swap window.
Pranav: I think we’re coming to the close of our time, so I think I wanna change to slightly personal questions. Not personal-personal, but like what you have seen over your career.
Nithin: Sorry. Can I ask one more question before we get into the personal stuff? How much time do we have? Ananth, do we have like 15 minutes?
Ananth Narayan: We do.
Nithin: All right. Okay, so let me ask a non-personal question before we get into this. I’m going back, as my final question then, to the interview we did eight years ago, that same thing. We’ll put it up on screen when we push this as a podcast as well. “The rupee should probably weaken a little more. At 70, 71, 72 — these are just numbers. On a real effective exchange rate basis, we are still overvalued.” So you spoke about the REER, and using that to understand whether the rupee was overvalued or not. At that point, if I remember correctly, the rupee was already depreciating, and you felt that they had quite a bit of way to go, because as per the REER, it looked still overvalued.
In today’s scenario, with the rupee at 95, I was just looking at the chart earlier, and it showed that the rupee is deeply undervalued. It used to be 105 a year and a half ago. Anything above 100 shows overvaluation, and today it’s 88. What is your reading on this situation? As a layperson who’s looking at where the rupee goes from here, is the REER chart something to look at and say, “Okay, this is where we are today”?
Ananth Narayan: So, you know what the REER is. It’s the real effective exchange rate. And by the way, the number which people normally look at is the 40-country trade-weighted real effective exchange rate.
And you’re absolutely right. I think there was a time when some people in the market were criticising the RBI for keeping the rupee too stable. It was not allowed to go beyond 84. This was in 2024. And at that time, if I remember, the REER was 107, 108 or so. Thereafter, we saw the interest rate cuts going through in 2025, and then we saw the rupee also kind of falling against the dollar. And remember, rupee was falling against the dollar at a time when dollar itself was falling against the euro and sterling and other currencies. So against the other currencies, rupee was falling even sharper, right?
So you’re absolutely right. The REER came down from 107 down to about 90, below 91. This was in, I think, April of this year. Maybe it’s come down to 88 now, I don’t know the number.
But couple of caveats. All these numbers are theoretical numbers, right? Professors like me and teachers like me and people who have nothing else to do, we come up with these fancy models and say this is the right valuation. End of the day, what matters is demand and supply. And once the market’s demand-supply determines something, then we’ll come and justify it and say this is the right number, right?
But as an indicator, is it a fair indicator? It’s a directional indicator. I would not give too much credence to the absolute numbers. I would not look at 107, I would not look at 88, if that’s the case, or 91. Those are models. But directionally, clearly over the last year and a half, rupee has become undervalued quite a bit. Is it fair value and all is a different question.
Does RBI look at it? Historically, RBI has looked at it, but from a medium to long-term perspective, which is practically equal to saying it doesn’t look at it, right? So I think — and I’m putting words into the governor’s mouth here — but when he said sometime in April, May, in one of the interviews that he gave in the press, saying that it looks like rupee is now undervalued, he was probably referring to the fact that he must have seen the REER and said, “Now it looks crazy,” right?
So directionally, it’s right. But ultimately, Nithin, it also depends a lot on what you choose as the base year. Here you have chosen 2015-16 as a base year. What’s to tell you that’s the right number? Why not some other base year?
Long story short, I would pay a lot more attention to actual supply and demand. Where is the current account deficit? Where is the FDI? Where is the FPI? Where is the sentiment? And therefore, where is the balance? Rather than spend too much time on theoretical models. And I would spend a lot of time on ensuring that whatever is the flow and the balance is sustainable in the medium term. If that means higher dollar-rupee, so be it. If it means lower dollar-rupee, so be it. As long as the flows are sustainable and it is achieving what we wanted in terms of growth, in terms of employment, in terms of GDP growth, all of that stuff.
So long story short, yes, I believe rupee is undervalued right now. It’s also true that over a period of time, as long as inflation is higher in India compared to the rest of the world, which it could be, that number will adjust by itself even if rupee remains where it is, right? And therefore you will see this undervaluation coming down over a period of time. But more important is not these theoretical models, it is the actual flows going on the ground, and making sure the flows are sustainable.
Nithin: Got it. So how soon away is 100?
Ananth Narayan: So look, I’m trying to answer with as straight a face as possible. There is a dollar-rupee forward market, right? As I mentioned, that market is purely a function of the interest rate differential between rupee interest rates and dollar interest rates. The current premium — I might be off by a few percentage points — is about 3% or something, right? Again, I might be off, because I’m not a trader looking at the markets every day.
So if it’s about three rupees of forward premia, give or take, one year forward is already about 98. Two year forward crosses 100. Okay? Having said that, do I think 100 is going to happen in a hurry? Personal view, again — if you make money off it, remember me. If you lose money on it, this conversation never happened. It’s all AI.
I don’t think RBI will let 100 happen in a hurry. The whole point of firing this bazooka was not to see 100 happen tomorrow. Unless dollar strengthens dramatically, Asian currencies collapse, and we are going in sync with the rest of the market, then it might allow it to happen. But I think clearly this bazooka has been fired to keep a lid on dollar-rupee. So I don’t think it’ll happen in two years’ time, but maybe five years’ time, yeah, sure, it’ll probably go there.
And by the way, that doesn’t mean anything really. You know, the dollar-rupee has gone from, what was it, 54 or something in 2013 to where we are right now. That doesn’t mean we’re doing worse off. Clearly as an economy, we’re much better off now, and just because a level of currency has gone somewhere doesn’t mean really anything by itself.
Pranav: So, at several points in this conversation, you have said that you’re an armchair professor and it’s the policymaker’s job to sort of deal with difficult questions. But you’ve not always been the armchair professor. You have been the policymaker. You’ve been a policymaker in this post-COVID time, when an avalanche of household savings are suddenly coming into the capital markets, and you’re sitting at the helm of the capital markets regulator.
One, what is that moment like? And I think from the outside, we keep talking about type I errors, type II errors — you want to ensure there’s no catastrophe, you don’t want to sort of stub out experiments as well from the market. But I’m sure when you’re actually sitting in the room and those things are actually happening, it’s a lot harder to distinguish, you know, how to calibrate those things. So what is your personal experience like, being a regulator in a time when so many things are changing and you have to take a decision on what to do?
Ananth Narayan: No, thanks for that. So look — for anybody who’s in the private sector, in markets, in trading, in banking, in financial industry or wherever, if you ever have a midlife crisis like I did, do look for a stint in public policy, either in the government or as a regulator.
I spent three years in SEBI. Of course, there were ups and downs, as in any particular job that you do. But in terms of sheer satisfaction, I would count this as amongst the best three years of my career — in terms of sheer satisfaction of making a small difference in a small way, and seeing the big picture much more than I ever did as a trader or as even running a business.
You hit the nail on the head. I think the real challenge when you sit in that regulatory seat is getting that balance right of type I and type II errors. You’ve stolen my thunder on that, and I’ve said this a hundred times in a hundred different podcasts. But type I errors are when a disaster happens. So when a Harshad Mehta happens, or when a massive fraud happens, or a scam of some kind happens, you know, something like a Rajesh Exports happens — that’s a type I error for a regulator. And regulators hate type I errors, because that’s the time all of you will wake up and say, “What the hell were you doing?” So none of us like to hear that, right? So for us, we are petrified of any type I errors. If there is a cybersecurity breach tomorrow, and God forbid, if all the data available in the depositories is made available in the dark web tomorrow, can you imagine what kind of a type I error that would be? So that is something which keeps us awake at night, right?
At the same time, in our zeal to prevent type I errors, if we come with loads of regulations — you know, hundreds of pages of regulations saying, “Thou shall not do this, and thou shall not do this, and thou shall do this” — then we make life extremely difficult for the good people to do capital formation, right?
So the real trick and balance is to figure out how do you minimise both. Now, those of you who’ve studied statistics, you cannot minimise type I and type II errors together in statistics. But that’s where the analogy drops. This is not statistics. This is formation of regulation. This is co-creation of regulation.
I really admired SEBI. I came into regulators as a trader and trading person who thought regulators are terrible. But my experience within SEBI told me that this is actually a very thoughtful regulator, that tries to understand issues very, very deeply, speaks to hundreds of stakeholders, tries to cover every single gamut of what’s happening in different parts of the ecosystem, and then tries to come up with a solution in consultation with the industry, such that both type I and type II errors are minimised.
Do we get it right at all times? Not at all. But is there at least an honest, open, transparent attempt, and everything is out in the public domain? Whatever we — we meaning SEBI — think on regulations, we pour our heart out in our consultation papers. There is nothing which is held back, and we say exactly what we think. So if there are mistakes, they are honest mistakes. They are not mistakes of not having tried enough. Okay? And that is really a challenge, and that can be hugely satisfying, when you get a market participant who calls you up and says, “I think you’ve done a good job of minimising both type I and type II errors.”
Now, as I said, is it always possible to get it right? Not really. And the other thing why I think it’s important that practitioners should come as regulators as well — each of the areas are so complicated. Look at what SEBI covers. SEBI covers brokers, it covers exchanges, clearing corporations, mutual funds, PMSs, FPIs, AIFs. There are some 26 different categories of regulated entities that we look at. On each of them, you can do a PhD. And if you look at broking, for instance, it’s a very involved practice. Now, sitting on the eighth floor in SEBI Bhavan, in my ivory tower, I will understand probably 5% of what you guys go through. So having practitioners who have been there, done that, sit in that seat, can be hugely enriching for the regulator. Now, that doesn’t mean there’s no conflict of interest, but I’m saying there are ways to control that conflict of interest and ensure that whatever you’re doing has checks and balances, and then we co-create the best way of reducing both type I and type II errors.
Pranav: That’s not all the questions we had. We had at least 20 times as many questions, but I’m sure the audience does too. So we’ll open the floor to the audience. Can someone pass the mic?
Audience member: Do you think RBI also had in mind, for why it reduced the interest rates, because of CPI being too low, from two to five percent over the years?
Ananth Narayan: Oh, absolutely. So don’t get me wrong, I’m not saying that RBI made a complete boo-boo. Of course, inflation was low, and of course, given inflation was averaging just 2% through the course of FY26, that was a very powerful reason to cut interest rates, right?
Where I’m saying maybe there is going forward more room for debate, is: inflation is an important input into figuring out what you want to do, but it’s not the only input. Taking a look at the impossible trinity to figure out what is the impact going to be on capital flows, what is therefore going to be the impact on the currency markets, I think is also important.
And in addition, remember, it was the MPC which cut interest rates by 125 basis points, from six and a half percent to five and a quarter percent. RBI went a step ahead, and as I said, bought ₹10 lakh crore of bonds in the open market operations. It paid a very large dividend, which is absolutely justified under the model that they follow, right? It kept liquidity in surplus, which meant that the short-term rates were kept really low. These were additional and over and above the rate cut itself. So when you’re taking such large interventions in the interest rate market, I think it’s important to have a collective debate on what could be the impact on capital flows and on currency markets.
And at least my proposition is, those low interest rates — which are a culmination of not just interest rate cuts, but also bond purchases and liquidity surpluses — had an impact on capital flows, contributed to some of the outflows that we saw, and therefore created a problem on the currency market as well.
So, you know, I was often asked this question, including on TV: should RBI use interest rates as a defence of the currency, right? This was in the June policy and so on and so forth. That’s a straw man question. It’s like saying, should you use a nuclear bomb now that the war is being lost, or whatever, right? The real debate to have, and the real thing to acknowledge or have a debate about, is that I think low interest rates during the course of FY25 and definitely FY26 had a big role to play in reducing capital flows and in creating weakness in the rupee. Now, it might be perfectly the right thing to do. All I’m saying, let’s debate it. If you look at the MPC minutes, if you look at the debates that happened with the folks in the RBI, there was never a debate on: did low interest rates have an offsetting impact on capital flows and currency markets? The Mundell-Fleming kind of trilemma that you talk about — why have we ignored that? It’s a well-known academic kind of a tenet.
So my limited point is, we’ve got to see things together. We can’t see things in isolation. Yes, inflation is a huge input justifying lower interest rates, but we can’t leave it at that. You’ve got to see what it does to capital flows and currency markets as well.
Audience member: So with China doing competitive devaluation and keeping their currency artificially low, why do we view the falling rupee as a necessarily bad thing? We often take it as a sentimental thing, like, you know, India lost at a World Cup cricket match or something. It’s good that our exports will become more competitive and eventually the economy will grow because of this.
Ananth Narayan: So, I hope you didn’t hear me say that rupee devaluation is necessarily a bad thing. It can be bad. By the way, those of you who have done MBAs — the one standard thing that you learn from an MBA education is that the answer to every question is just two words: it depends, right? So is rupee depreciation a bad thing? It depends. As I said, if rupee depreciation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy which actually starts to impact the fundamentals — the reflexivity that we discussed — that’s a bad thing, right?
The larger issue that you raise is important. With weaker currency, do we really see exports going up? Now, there is some research which is happening. I think people like Sajjid Chinoy of JP Morgan, they have done some work around this. But the results are mixed on really what is the sensitivity of India’s exports to a weaker currency. As I mentioned, a lot of the issues are not currency. It’s to do with the real economy. It’s to do with ease of investments, manufacturing, availability of skilled labour, all of those things, which is not currency related. Having said that, if you look at the export data for April and May, they’re looking very, very good. So maybe the data will now show that maybe there is a positive impact of a weaker currency.
The second thing I want to mention is the opportunity for India going forward. By the way, I don’t know how many of you are tracking this. Europe has a big problem — not just with the US and NATO, all the rubbish happening around Greenland and all that. Europe has a problem with China as well. So the average trade deficit for the EU region with China is 32 billion euros per month right now. So Germany, where the SMEs, the Mittelstand, I think it’s called — I’m probably pronouncing this completely wrong, so forgive me for that. So the engineering marvel that Germany is, was because of the SMEs that you had in Germany, all small and medium enterprises, which are absolutely brilliant in what they do. That entire layer is getting killed right now because of cheap imports from China, right?
And they are saying — by the way, Chancellor Merz recently, in the last month I think, he made a statement that the yuan is overvalued by 30%, and that the EU wants China to correct some of this by October. And remember, China holds a trump card of actually having the supply of rare earth metals and materials, right? So which means that it’s not easy to get China to do what you want them to do, right?
I think this is a huge opportunity for India. How is it that we managed to sign that EU-India FTA and the trade and investment agreement? Europeans are, by the way, even more bureaucratic than we are. Getting them to sign something is not easy. But both EU and India have hastened to get this. Hopefully we’ll get this signed by end of this year or by March, right? I think we have a huge opportunity, because Europe has a China problem — I think we can draw in FDI from Europe, allow that to set up manufacturing in India. It will not necessarily mean more exports to Europe, but if it can at least mean a replacement of the imports that we do from China to satisfy our own domestic demand, it’s a huge win-win, both for Europe as well as for us, right?
So the fact that a yuan which is kept extremely weak for the time being actually presents an opportunity for us to draw in FDI from Europe and from other countries looking for a China Plus One. So across all the FTAs, I think we have a huge opportunity in front of us. Getting that real economy bit right — of education, of skilled labour, of ease of land acquisition, of getting the regulatory cholesterol across all the babudom — I think that is gonna be very, very key.
Audience member: Hi sir, here. No political agenda. Do you really believe that the GDP number is real? That’s the first question. Second question is, if we allow retail to outbound the dollar, don’t you think that it will impact the rupee again?
Nithin: Ananth, we’ll switch off the cameras, so don’t worry about it.
Ananth Narayan: I think the GDP numbers are reasonably okay. Okay? I think over the last three, four years, they’ve improved a lot. So MOSPI, the department that looks at statistics in the government, has done a lot of reform over the last three, four years. And this is purely apolitical. There’s no political angle to this at all. In fact, the secretary who runs that particular department, Mr. Garg, he deserves a lot of kudos. I think he’s done a fantastic job. So you’re aware that I think somebody rated us a C on statistics and all that. A lot of those issues have been resolved now.
And I’ll tell you why I think the numbers are okay. I’ll give you two statistics. One thing I track very closely — CMIE comes out with this, there’s something called CMIE Prowess, which gives out data on a whole host of companies, the listed companies space. You get a lot of data on what’s really happening there. Look at the earnings growth of around five thousand companies which CMIE Prowess tracks. FY25 was not that great. FY26 were actually quite good earnings growth. It was about 14%, if I remember correctly, of earnings growth over that particular period. That wasn’t bad.
I’ll give you another statistic, again from CMIE. CMIE is not government. It’s entirely independent, right? CMIE conducts this employment survey, which is very well-regarded. It’s called the Consumer Pyramids Household Survey, CPHS. I’m not a trained economist, so I don’t remember the acronyms. But it’s a fantastic survey, very deep survey. And typically, like during the times of demonetisation, GST implementation, it was showing very poor employment data. It was actually showing that employment is going down. The last two years, CMIE data shows remarkable growth in employment. And this is not the periodic labour force survey of the government. It is from the CMIE. In fact, the numbers seem to tally if you do some adjustments between the government and the CMIE tallies. So irrespective of what we think, actually employment data seems to be going up again, buttressing the fact that maybe the GDP data is not that bad.
Having said that — should we be happy with what we have as GDP data, and should we be happy with the kind of growth that we have? Absolutely not. I think there’s very little doubt that we are underemployed as a population. The statistics that I mentioned of 55% labour force participation rate, it is shameful. And it has been there for the last 25, 30 years. I mean, it’s not at any government, across all governments, right? Similarly, the female participation of 35% — it’s a terrible number. And by the way, the 35%, it includes women who are helping in the household business, or including in agriculture, and not getting paid. So if a woman is helping her farmer husband farm the land, not getting paid, it is counted as employed. Despite that, it’s only 35%. We have a serious problem.
So is there room for more GDP growth? Is there more room for us to improve our manufacturing? Is there more room to produce more? Is there more room to empower our young people to create new businesses? 100%. And we make life really tough to open new businesses. So is it a number that we should be happy with? Absolutely not.
Audience member: As you earlier said, the FTA India and Europe has signed, it will be beneficial, but India is also facing competition from China. India is also importing so much from China, so how can we tackle that?
Ananth Narayan: So, what I mentioned about — the Chinese economy is slowing down domestically. Domestic consumption is not looking great, so they are definitely looking towards exports to keep their economic growth going through, right? So they are justified in what they’re doing. And by the way, you have got to hand it over to the Chinese. I think the ecosystem that they’ve created across sub supply chains, across manufacturing, is just amazing. You know, we’ve been talking about China Plus One for a long time. Most major companies have figured out it’s not easy to move away from China. You’re just kind of stuck to having to rely on the supply chain in China in one way or the other.
I think we’ve got to do a couple of things. One is, across the globe, as I said, there are concerns about China overproducing and killing domestic industry. It’s not just India, it’s also Europe. US is clearly worried about all this, the trade deficit that they have with China. In our case though, I think it’s a bit of a travesty that many of the imports that we do from China, frankly, we can do ourselves. There is no reason why we cannot create a competitive domestic industry which produces the same thing.
Take the example of chemicals, right? For our pharma industry, many of the molecules have to be imported from China. Now, I’m not saying it’ll happen overnight — I’m not a pharma expert, but pharma experts will tell you that it’ll take five, ten years before we can create that ecosystem in India. But should we be starting now to create that ecosystem in India? Of course, we should. Toys actually was a success story. You know, a few years back, we used to import all our toys from China. Now the toys are made in India. Similarly, with things like machinery products, with things like engineering products, electronics — eventually we should be able to start making things here in India itself. And the government has tried through PLI. We’ve had some patchy successes, including with Apple and all that, but clearly the larger thing has a lot more room to grow.
I think eventually getting our people employed in manufacturing, including in services as well, and creating value — but not purely by protection. The reason I was hesitating so much: it’s tempting to say ban imports from China and let’s manufacture everything onshore in India. The risk with that is that you’ll create a very inefficient domestic industry, which will take you back to the time of Ambassador cars and Premier Padminis, where your quality just goes for a toss.
What you need is maybe some protection for some time, with a very clear path, like Korea did, like China did. That boss, in three, four, five years, you have to become globally competitive. You have to have exports. You will have to stop relying on PLI or subsidies from India. You have to stand up on your own feet. That is extremely crucial. So I think whatever it takes to get that going, you’ve got to do.
And it goes back to what I mentioned in very, very broad terms — of things like land acquisition, things like skilled labour, things like having ITIs which actually supply labour to the industry in that particular zone. Things like maybe having the old export processing zones all over again, such that you remove all regulations in that particular zone and you start from scratch, and you put, you know, like China did with their Shanghai and the other export processing zones. Bunch of things probably need to happen. I’m not the expert. You’d probably get somebody else far better than me to speak about these things. But that real economy has to — you’re right. We should be doing a lot more ourselves, and therefore reducing our dependence on China, but in a manner that is globally competitive, and in a manner that makes us stand on our own feet rather than rely on subsidies and PLIs.
Pranav: So Ananth, are you okay with three more questions? I’m sure there are 10 or more, but let’s do three questions for now.
Ananth Narayan: Sure.
Audience member: I have a question related to the discussion we had, how money is created into the economy. India has run fiscal deficits for many years, and also some states have very high debt levels, like in UP, et cetera. Also, today around 40% of our government expenditure goes to debt servicing. So how do we still function as an efficient economy when we compare to the rest of South Asia, even though there are so many deficits and spending?
Ananth Narayan: It’s a great question, and probably the topic of a separate session with somebody separately. I’ll give you a very broad answer.
Look, fiscal spending is not necessarily a bad thing by itself, as long as the output it generates is higher than the cost of the fiscal deficit. So if you’re borrowing at, let’s say, 7%, but if you’re able to create a GDP growth which is far in excess of that by your spending on a sustainable basis, it’s not a bad thing. As an example — we already created two freight corridors. If you create multiple freight corridors and invest in roads, in ports, in energy, in airports and all of that infrastructure, which then has a multiplier in terms of growing your GDP at a much faster rate, that’s not a bad thing, right?
The challenge is, a lot of the spending that we seem to be doing goes towards revenue deficits, which is, you’re spending a lot more for paying salaries, for paying subsidies, for showering love on your sisters, which exceeds your tax income for that year, right? That is a little bit tricky.
Now, by the way, there is research required here also. Many economists used to laugh at these midday noon meal schemes in the past, saying it’s a wasteful expenditure. It turned out it was a brilliant expenditure, because the social benefit and actually the economic benefit which came out with things like that was really, really good. So maybe all these jokes I’m making about love to sisters actually turns out to be something positive. I don’t know what the research will show. But at least prima facie, it’s possible that some of this expenditure is not productive, right?
Personally, I think what we should do — you know, earlier we had something called, we still have this thing called FRBM, Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, right? It’s been forgotten now for many years. One of the tenets of that FRBM was that the revenue deficit should come down to zero, which means you run a fiscal deficit, but run it entirely to do capital expenditure, entirely into infrastructure, entirely into growing new businesses. Call me old-fashioned, but I believe in that. I think we should have that discipline — say, you do whatever you want to spend, you give whatever subsidy you want to do, but make sure that is not higher than what you earn as taxes. And then you borrow to spend to create new capacity, to create new infrastructure. That’s absolutely fine. I think that fiscal deficit discipline will be very, very good. I wish our political parties across the spectrum can have that debate and enshrine this at a pan-India level. Otherwise, we run this risk of a competitive spiral down, where everybody promises more than the other in terms of doles and direct cash transfers, which can become a real problem, both for inflation as well as for debt management.
Audience member: Sir, sir, I have a question. Few months ago, Donald Trump said that he wants to do an audit of the gold reserves of the US. So is he signalling that they want to do a gold revaluation? And how much can the rupee appreciate if the gold revaluation takes place?
Ananth Narayan: Oh my God. I think anything which involves trying to guess what’s going on in the mind of Donald Trump is more hazardous than trying to guess where dollar-rupee will be tomorrow.
No, genuinely — look, the reality is, I think with President Trump, he’s the leader of the biggest country that matters in the world. So all the jokes about him have to be tempered with the acceptance that he leads the US and he represents the US currency.
I think the larger question that you’re asking is: we had Bretton Woods, and then we moved away from the gold standard and moved into a free-floating currency with the dollar as the key currency. Will we eventually move to something new, where something replaces the dollar — either gold or I don’t know what? I hate to say crypto, but something. Will something else go there? I think there’s a lot of debate happening on that subject.
The reality is there is a fiat currency debasement happening right now. People are skeptical about fiat currencies, including central banks. Central banks buying so much of gold is because they are skeptical about fiat currencies. But I think it’s too early to tell what shape and form the new monetary compact can look like. I’m guessing that with all the advancements happening in AI — we’ve not even talked about AI — but all the advancements happening in AI and in technology and in capital markets and everything, I suspect that in ten, fifteen years’ time we’ll be looking at a new compact. But I suspect I’ll be the last person to guess what that can look like, because I’m too old and old-fashioned and hardwired about the past. Young minds, including here, will probably define what the future will look like.
But it does look like the compact will need to change, because the current fiat currency model seems to be fraying at the seams, particularly if geopolitics continues to fray, as it seems like doing over a period of time. You know, China and the US are at peace right now, but it’s a very dubious and kind of short-term kind of peace. So we don’t know how these things will end up. The CEA, Anantha Nageswaran, is fond of saying it’s like the time between the First and Second World War. So we might be in a period where there’s a lot of flux which is gonna happen and keep all you young people very, very busy over the next 20 years.
Audience member: My question was — I think during the informal conversation you mentioned a very interesting concept about the over-financialisation of the Indian economy, and the CEA has also backed this. I think that’s an interesting concept. In your opinion, why do you think Indians in general became more curious and kind of more involved in the financial market, as compared to building a stable fundamental economy like probably China did through manufacturing? What do you think were the most pivotal moments in the politico-economic history of India in the past twenty years that actually led to this over-reliance, or over-indexing of the financial market as compared to structural drivers?
Ananth Narayan: Each of these questions deserves a podcast by itself.
Let me ask you again, show of hands — how many of you, the young ones especially, how many of you want a career in manufacturing? Again, you deserve a prize of some kind, you know. Here, we’ll give you some chocolates. How many of you will deal in financial markets, you know, and will invest in? So your answer is here, right?
So, again, nothing wrong with financial markets per se. I’m somebody whose bread and butter has been sponsored by financial markets. I’m the last person to say financial markets are bad. I just think that we really have to get our — I don’t want the financial markets to go down. I just want our real economy to go up, right?
And I wish — you know, I used to teach at SPJIMR, our MBA institution. We used to have a lot of very, very smart people out there, fantastic kids, many of them in finance. And I used to take electives for the finance cohort. Again, a lot of them were going into fintechs, into financial institutions, into trading, investment banking. Not many were even thinking about starting something where you employ 100 people and start actually doing something in the real economy.
I think the problem is, we’ve not made working in the real economy easy. But Zerodha’s made trading and equity so simple, right? Open the app and you start punching your fingers and you can buy and sell whatever you want, right? I’m guessing that if — like in the credit markets, and we talked about the debt markets, the fact that it’s not really grown because we’ve not been easy — I’m guessing that if we made starting a company and creating value by doing things easier, I’m guessing many of you would move in that direction. I think we’ve got to make manufacturing, creating new businesses, as sexy as dealing in financial markets. And that’s the challenge that we have.
Pranav: And that, my folks, was the last question. I’m really, really sorry for cutting this down so short. But I think we’re already one hour overtime. Thank you so much for really being this patient. Thank you, Ananth sir.
Ananth Narayan: Thank you, Nithin and Pranav.


Thank you very much for this outstanding interview regarding financial markets and real economy. This offering through subtext is, perhaps, the best offering amongst all others from your side. It provides a wealth of information and a lot of food for thought after hearing pretty much from the horses mouth. Of course, the wonderful manner in which these interviews are conducted helps too. Please continue this offering as it is without any change going forward. A request: would it be possible to have some industry personnel from any of the manufacturing sector to talk about the country’s journey, its successes and failures towards improving the manufacturing over the years, more so in the context of demographic dividend that we are supposed to have. It would be great to have this perspective from an industry veteran.